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PUNISHING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: LEGAL FICTION OR SCIENCE FICTION 
 
Ryan Abbott1 and Alex Sarch2 
 
ABSTRACT: Whether causing flash crashes in financial markets, purchasing 
illegal drugs, or running over pedestrians, AI is increasingly engaging in activity 
that would be criminal for a natural person, or even an artificial person like a 
corporation. We argue that criminal law falls short in cases where an AI causes 
certain types of harm and there are no practically or legally identifiable upstream 
criminal actors. This Article explores potential solutions to this problem, focusing 
on holding AI directly criminally liable where it is acting autonomously and 
irreducibly. Conventional wisdom holds that punishing AI is incongruous with 
basic criminal law principles such as the capacity for culpability and the 
requirement for a guilty mind. 
 
Drawing on analogies to corporate and strict criminal liability, as well as familiar 
imputation principles, we show a coherent theoretical case can be constructed for 
AI punishment. AI punishment could result in general deterrence and expressive 
benefits, and it need not run afoul of negative limitations such as punishing in 
excess of culpability. Ultimately, however, punishing AI is not justified, because it 
might entail significant costs and it would certainly require radical legal changes. 
Modest changes to existing criminal laws that target persons, together with 
potentially expanded civil liability, are a better solution to AI crime. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015, an artist going by the moniker “Random Darknet Shopper” (RDS) purchased 
Ecstasy and a Hungarian passport for display in an art exhibit.3 This was part of a performance 
project where RDS was given $100 in the cryptocurrency bitcoin each week to make a purchase 
from an online marketplace. The items were then shipped to a Swiss art gallery and put on 
exhibit. After learning about the exhibit from social media, Swiss police took RDS into custody 
along with the purchases.4 
 
What makes this story interesting for our purposes is that RDS was an artificial intelligence 
(AI), and hardly the first to have a run in with law enforcement.5 If RDS had been a person 
located within the U.S., it could be criminally prosecuted under U.S. law.6 For that matter, 
entities involved in this activity other than RDS might also be criminally prosecuted, such as 
those supplying the bitcoin and hosting the exhibition.7 Luckily for RDS and crew, the Swiss 
authorities were art fans.8 
 
Cases like this will pose new challenges. The RDS case may be relatively straightforward, 
but programs exist that are autonomous, decentralized, and “unstoppable”.9 What if RDS had 
been open source software that individuals from around the world independently helped to 
program? What if RDS was instead “Random Shopper”, designed to purchase necessities for 
college dorms while relying on machine learning to improve? What if it had been initially 
programmed to only purchase items from Amazon, but learned from online user content that 
some necessities could be purchased at lower cost from other websites, and that a broader 
understanding of “necessities” exists? What if Random Shopper existed only on a distributed 
ledger, a decentralized technology that supports smart contracts and cryptocurrencies, so that it 
could not easily be deactivated? What if it earned its own funds from financial trading? 
 
These scenarios suggest that criminal law may soon be confronted with some hard 
questions.10 For example, if Random Shopper autonomously bought Ecstasy, in a manner not 
foreseeable to its developers, should those individuals be criminally liable? For that matter, who 
                                                        
3 Arjun Kharpal, Robot with $100 bitcoin buys drugs, gets arrested, CNBC (Apr. 22, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/21/robot-with-100-bitcoin-buys-drugs-gets-arrested.html. 
4 Id. 
5 See Matt Novak, Was This The First Robot Ever Arrested?, GIZMODO (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://paleofuture.gizmodo.com/was-this-the-first-robot-ever-arrested-1524686968 (describing police confiscation 
in 1982 of a robot: “The police considered citing [its owner] for failing to obtain a permit for advertising…but no 
charges were filed and the robot was ultimately returned.”). Robot encounters with law enforcement are becoming 
more common. See, e.g., Peter Dockrill, A Robot Was Just 'Arrested' by Russian Police, SCIENCE ALERT (Sept. 20, 
2016), https://www.sciencealert.com/a-robot-was-just-arrested-by-russian-police. 
6 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (criminalizing distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance).  
7 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (making it a crime to aid and abet offenses). 
8 Random Darknet Shopper was eventually returned to its creators together with all of the purchases except the 
Ecstasy. Kharpal, supra note 1 (noting that prosecutor’s comment “that the possession of Ecstasy was indeed a 
reasonable means for the purpose of sparking public debate about questions related to the exhibition”). Apparently, 
the Hungarian passport was also returned. Id. 
9 See Section IIA, infra (discussing the DAO).  
10 See Christopher Markou, We Could Soon Face A Robot Crimewave: The Law Needs to Be Ready, THE 
CONVERSATION (April 11, 2017), https://theconversation.com/we-could-soon-face-a-robot-crimewave-the-law-
needs-to-be-ready-75276 
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should count as its developers, and which ones would be liable? Should its owners be liable, and 
what if it has no owners? Should its users be liable, and what if it has no users? Perhaps Random 
Shopper itself should be held criminally liable. 
 
The possibility of directly criminally punishing AI is receiving increased attention by the 
popular press and legal scholars alike.11 Perhaps the best-known defender of punishing AI is 
Gabriel Hallevy. He contends that “[w]hen an Al entity establishes all elements of a specific 
offense, both external and internal, there is no reason to prevent imposition of criminal liability 
upon it for that offense.”12 In his view, “[i]f all of its specific requirements are met, criminal 
liability may be imposed upon any entity—human, corporate or AI entity.”13 Drawing on the 
analogy to corporations,14 Hallevy asserts that “AI entities are taking larger and larger parts in 
human activities, as do corporations,” and he concludes that “there is no substantive legal 
difference between the idea of criminal liability imposed on corporations and on AI entities.”15 
“Modern times,” he contends, “warrant modern legal measures.”16  
 
In contrast to punishment expansionists like Hallevy, skeptics might be inclined to write off 
the idea of punishing AI from the start as conceptual confusion—akin to hitting one’s computer 
when it crashes. If AI is just a machine, then surely the fundamental categories of the criminal 
law like criminal culpability—a “guilty mind” that is characterized by insufficient regard for 
legally protected values17—would be misplaced. One might think the whole idea of punishing AI 
can be easily dispensed with as inconsistent with basic criminal law principles.  
 
The idea of punishing AI is due for fresh consideration. This Article takes a measured look at 
the proposal, informed by theory and practice alike. We argue punishment of AI cannot be 
categorically ruled out. Harm caused by a sophisticated AI may be more than a mere accident 
where no wrongdoing is implicated. Some AI-generated harms may stem from difficult to reduce 
behaviors of an autonomous system, whose actions resemble those of other subjects of the 
criminal law, especially corporations. Corporations can directly face criminal charges when their 
defective procedures generate condemnable harms18—particularly in scenarios where structural 
problems in corporate systems and processes are difficult to reduce to the wrongful actions of 
                                                        
11 See id. Jeffrey Wale & David Yuratich, Robot Law: What Happens If Intelligent Machines Commit Crimes, THE 
CONVERSATION (Jul. 1, 2015), http://theconversation.com/robot-law-what-happens-if-intelligent-machines-commit-
crimes-44058; J.K.C. Kingston, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Liability (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07782.pdf; Gabriel Hallevy, The Punishibility of Artificial Intelligence Technology, 
LIABILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 185-227 (2014), 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-10124-8_6; Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S. 
Carolina. L. Rev. 579, 580 (2018). 
12 Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities: The Criminal Liability of Artificial 
Intelligence Entities—From Science Fiction to Legal Social Control, 4 AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL 
171, 191 (2010). 
13 Id. at 199. 
14 Id. at 200 (asking why AI entities should be treated “different from corporations”).  
15 Id. at 201 
16 Id. at 199. 
17 Alex Sarch, Who Cares What You Think? The Irrelevance of Unmanifested Mental States, 36 L. & PHIL. 707 
(2017). 
18 Model Penal Code § 2.07 (outlining conditions under which a corporation could be convicted of an offense). 
 
  5 
individuals.19 It is necessary to do the difficult pragmatic work of thinking through the 
theoretical costs and benefits of AI punishment, how it could be implemented in practice, and to 
consider the alternatives.  
 
Our inquiry focuses on the strongest case for punishing AI: scenarios where crimes are 
functionally committed by machines and there is no identifiable person who has acted with 
criminal culpability. We call these Hard AI Crimes. This can occur when no person has acted 
with criminal culpability, or when it is not practicably defensible to reduce an AI’s behavior to 
bad actors. There could be general deterrent and expressive benefits from imposing criminal 
liability on AI in such scenarios. Moreover, the most important negative, retributivist-style 
limitations that apply to persons need not prohibit AI punishment. On the other hand, there may 
be costs associated with AI punishment: conceptual confusion, expressive costs, spillover, and 
rights creep.20 In the end, our conclusion is this: While a coherent theoretical case can be 
constructed for AI punishment, it is not ultimately justified in light of the less disruptive 
alternatives that can provide substantially the same benefits. 
 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief background to AI and “AI crime.” It 
then provides a framework for justifying punishment that considers affirmative benefits, negative 
limitations, and feasible alternatives. Part III considers potential benefits to AI punishment, and 
argues it could provide general deterrence and expressive benefits. Part IV examines whether 
punishment of AI would violate any of the negative limitations on punishment that relate to 
desert, fairness and the capacity for culpability. It finds that the most important constraints on 
punishment, such as requiring a capacity for culpability for it to be appropriately imposed, would 
not be violated by AI punishment. 
 
Finally, Part V considers feasible alternatives to AI punishment. It argues the status quo is 
likely inadequate for properly addressing AI crime. While direct AI punishment is a solution, this 
would require problematic changes to the criminal law. Alternately, AI crime could be addressed 
through modest changes to criminal laws applied to individuals together with potentially 
expanded civil liability. We argue that civil liability is generally preferable to criminal liability 
for AI activity as it is proportionate to the scope of the current problem and a less significant 
departure from existing practice with fewer costs. In this way, the Article aims to map out the 
possible responses to the problem of harmful AI activity and makes the case for approaching AI 
punishment with extreme caution.  
 
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND PUNISHMENT 
 
A. Introduction to Artificial Intelligence  
 
                                                        
19 See infra notes 159–161 and accompanying text (discussing ways to defend the irreducibility of corporate 
culpability); William Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L. J. 647, 664-68 (1994) (outlining 
prevalent models of “genuine corporate culpability” including proactive fault, reactive fault, corporate ethos and 
corporate policy).  
20 See Part IV.  
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We use the term “AI” to refer to a machine that acts intelligently.21 AI only sometimes has 
the ability to directly act physically, as in the case of a “robot,” but it is not necessary for an AI 
to directly affect physical activity to cause harm (as the RDS case demonstrates).  
 
AI is rapidly improving, driven by advances in software, computing power, and big data.22 
Hardly a day goes by without a new report of some impressive feat achieved by AI. In 2017, 
Alphabet’s flagship DeepMind AI beat the world champion of the board game Go.23 This was 
considered an important feat in the AI community, because of the sheer complexity of the 
game.24 There are more possible Go board configurations than there are atoms in the universe.25 
Thus, a machine designed to play Go cannot simply be preprogrammed with optimal 
predetermined moves, or solely rely on a brute force approach to considering a large number of 
future moves.26 Go was the last traditional board game at which people had been able to 
outperform machines.27 
 
In some areas, AI already makes significant practical contributions. For instance, Google 
translate supports more than 100 languages, including 37 by photo, 32 by voice, and 27 in 
“augmented reality mode.”28 The increasing prevalence and capability of AI will lead to 
widespread social benefit, but will also cause harm. Virtually all activity involves a risk of harm, 
and as AI comes to do more it will inevitably cause more harm.29  
 
A few of features of AI are important to highlight. First, AI has the potential to act 
unpredictably.30 Some leading AIs rely on machine learning or similar technologies which 
involve a computer program, initially created by individuals, further developing in response to 
data without explicit programming.31 This is one means by which AI can engage in 
unforeseeable activities its original programmers may not have intended.32  
 
                                                        
21 AI lacks a standard definition, but its very first definition in 1956 holds up reasonably well: “the artificial 
intelligence problem is taken to be that of making a machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a 
human were so behaving.” J. McCarthy et al., A Proposal For The Dartmouth Summer Research Project On 
Artificial Intelligence, (1955), http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html. See, Ryan 
Abbott, Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property: A Guide for Small and Medium Enterprises. World 
Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland (forthcoming 2019) (providing background on this 
definition). 
22 Ryan Abbott, Everything is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV 4, 23–28 (2019). 
23 Id at 25. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Google Translate, https://translate.google.com/intl/en/about/languages/ (last visited January 27, 2019) 
29 See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots Roam, N.Y 
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html 
30 See, e.g., http://aiweirdness.com/post/174691534037/why-did-the-neural-network-cross-the-road (discussing the 
programmer who made her machine learning algorithm attempt to tell jokes).   
31 Abbott, supra note 22 at 25. 
32 There has been a recent focus on biased decisions by machine learning algorithms—sometimes due to a 
programmer’s implicit bias, sometimes due to biased training data. See, e.g., Chris DeBrusk, The Risk of Machine-
Learning Bias (and How to Prevent It), MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW (2018), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-risk-of-machine-learning-bias-and-how-to-prevent-it/. 
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Second, AI has the potential to act unexplainably. It may be possible to determine what an AI 
has done, but not how or why it acted as it did.33 This has led to some AIs being described as 
“black box” systems.34 For instance, an algorithm may refuse a credit application but not be able 
to articulate why the application was rejected.35 That is particularly likely in the case of AIs that 
learn from data, and which may have been exposed to millions or billions of data points.36 Even 
if it is theoretically possible to explain an AI outcome, it may be impracticable given the 
potentially resource intensive nature of such inquiries, and the need to maintain earlier versions 
of AI and specific data. 
 
Third, AI may act autonomously. For our purposes, that is to say an AI may cause harm 
without being directly controlled by an individual. Suppose an individual creates an AI to steal 
financial information by mimicking a bank’s website, stealing user information, and posting that 
information online. While the theft may be entirely reducible to an individual who is using the 
AI as a tool, the AI may continue to act without further human involvement. It may even be the 
case that the individual who sets an AI in motion is not able to regain control of the AI, which 
could be by design.37 
 
Fourth, while AI can already outperform people in spectacular fashion in some domains, like 
board games, in other domains AI is not competitive with toddlers.38 That is because all AI is 
designed to perform “narrow” or “specific” tasks.39 DeepMind can beat the world’s best human 
player at Go, but it could not translate English to French without being programmed to do so.40 
By contrast, the holy grail of computer science research is developing “general” AI that could 
perform any task that a person could perform.41 Experts are divided on whether, and when, 
general AI will be developed. For now, the weight of expert opinion holds there will, probably, 
be no general AI for at least a couple of decades.42  
 
Of course, it is possible for a conventional machine to perform unpredictably, unexplainably, 
or autonomously. However, at a minimum, AI is far more likely to exhibit these characteristics, 
and to exhibit them to a greater extent. Even a sufficient difference in degree along several axes 
makes AI worth considering as a distinctive phenomenon, possibly meriting novel legal 
responses. 
                                                        
33 Abbott, supra note 21 (providing background on this definition). 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 “The DAO” was the most famous attempt to create a decentralized autonomous organization. See Samuel Falkon, 
The Story of the DAO — Its History and Consequences, THE STARTUP (Dec. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/swlh/the-
story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-71e6a8a551ee. The concept was to deploy an entity could no longer 
be controlled by its creators and would act without further direction. The DAO would operate according to smart 
contract, or pre-programmed rules dictating future behavior. A DAO might be used to create an entity operating 
according to publicly available, unalterable code on a distributed ledger to prevent corporate mismanagement. 
Unfortunately, the DAO failed shortly after launch on Ethereum due to programming flaws and hacker interference. 
Id. 
38 Abbott, supra note 22 at 23–28. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 See generally Vincent C. Müller & Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert 
Opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 553 (Vincent C. Müller ed., 2016). 
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Finally, general AI, and even super- or ultra-intelligent AI,43 is different than the sort of self-
aware, conscious, sentient AIs that are common in science fiction. The latter sorts of AIs, 
sometimes referred to as “strong AI,” are portrayed as having human-like abilities to cognitively 
reason and to be morally culpable for their actions.44 Today, even the prospect of such machines 
is safely within the realm of science fiction.45 We will not consider punishment of strong AI.46  
 
B. A framework for understanding AI crime  
 
We use the term “AI crime” as a loose shorthand for cases in which an AI would be 
criminally liable if a natural person acted similarly. Machines have caused harm since ancient 
times, and robots have caused fatalities since at least the 1970s.47 However, besides machines 
being intentionally used to inflict harm (as when I run someone over with my car), most harms 
caused by machines are seen as mere accidents. The exception is when the culpable carelessness 
of people using a machine caused the harm (as when negligence in using drilling machinery 
caused the BP oil spill).48 Such harms are not mere accidents; rather, they are accidents that 
implicate the criminal law.49 Nonetheless, even in such cases, the criminal law is not usually 
deployed as against the harmful machines themselves (at least outside of some intriguing but 
archaic prosecutions of inanimate objects).50 It may be that AI crimes are no different than any 
other harm for which a machine is involved.  
 
Yet AI can differ from conventional machines in a couple of essential respects that makes the 
direct application of the criminal law more worthy of consideration. Specifically, AI can behave 
in ways that display high degrees of autonomy and irreducibility.51  In terms of autonomy, AI is 
capable of behaving largely independently of human control. AI can receive sensory input, set 
                                                        
43 Abbott, supra note 22 at 23–28 (describing super- and ultra-intelligent AI). 
44 Jesus Rodriguez, Consciousness and the Weak vs. Strong AI Debate, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (August 23, 2018), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/g%C3%B6del-consciousness-and-the-weak-vs-strong-ai-debate-51e71a9189ca 
45 Id. 
46 If and when such machines come into existence, we will certainly enjoy reading their works on AI criminal 
liability. 
47 Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2018); Bryan Young, The First 'Killer Robot' Was Around Back in 1979, HOW STUFF WORKS (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://science.howstuffworks.com/first-killer-robot-was-around-back-in-1979.htm. 
48 Clifford Krauss and John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/global/16iht-bp16.html. 
49 BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and 
Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident, DOJ PRESS RELEASE (Nov. 15, 2012) 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-exploration-and-production-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-
environmental (outlining BP’s guilty plea to criminal offenses). 
50 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 24 (during Edward I’s reign “[i]f a man fell from a tree, the tree 
was deodand”— forfeited as an “accursed thing” and given to God); Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of 
England: In Four Books, ch. 8, The King’s Revenue, p. 302; Albert Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of 
Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 Boston U. L. Rev. 307, 312 (1991) (“Just as primitive people hated 
and punished the wheel of a cart that had run someone over…some of us truly manage to hate the corporate entity.”). 
51 We will not attempt to articulate the non-functional differences between human and algorithmic reasoning, a 
subject which has fascinated and confounded computer scientists since the 1950s. A.M. Turing, Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433–51 (1950). Functionally, AI and people can exhibit similar patterns 
of behavior and information processing, regardless of whether machines “think” or understand what they do. See 
Chalmers, infra note 118 (distinguishing intellectual capacities from phenomenal consciousness). 
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targets, assess outcomes against criteria, make decisions and adjust behavior to increase its 
likelihood of success—all without being directed by human orders.52 Reducibility is also critical, 
because if an AI engages in an act that would be criminal for a person and the act is reducible, 
then there typically will be a person that could be criminally liable.53 If an AI act is not 
effectively reducible, there may be no other party that is aptly punished, in which case intuitively 
criminal activity could occur without the possibility of punishment.  
 
Many, likely most, AI crimes are likely to be reducible. For instance, if an individual 
develops an AI to hack into a self-driving car to disable vital safety features, that individual has 
directly committed a crime.54 If someone strikes another person with a rock, the rock has not 
committed battery—the individual throwing the rock has. Even where AI behaves autonomously, 
to the extent that a person uses AI as a tool to commit a crime, and the AI functions foreseeably, 
the crime involves an identifiable defendant causing harm. Even when AI causes unforeseeable 
harm this may still be reducible, for example, if an individual creates an AI to steal financial 
information, but a programming error results in the AI shutting down an electrical grid thus 
disrupting hospital care. This is a familiar problem for criminal law.55 If someone commits a 
robbery and in so doing causes injuries to bystanders in unforeseeable ways (imagine a tripped 
bank alarm startles the animals in a neighboring zoo and they break loose and trample 
pedestrians), the criminal law has doctrinal tools by which liability could still be imposed.56  
 
Some of the time, however, it may be difficult to reduce AI crime to an individual due to AI 
autonomy, complexity, or unexplainability. A large number of individuals may contribute to 
development of an AI over a long period of time. For instance, with some open source software, 
thousands of people can collaborate informally to create an AI.57 In the case of AI that develops 
in response to training with data, it may be difficult to attribute responsibility for an AI output 
where the machine has learned how to behave based on accessing millions or billions of data 
points from heterogenous sources.58 Thus, it may be more difficult to assign fault to individuals 
where AI is concerned versus a conventional product such as a car where one component is 
faulty. In fact, it may be practically impossible to reduce an AI generated harm to the actions of 
individuals. 
 
Even where AI developers are known, an AI might end up causing harm without any 
unreasonable human behavior. Suppose two experienced and expert programmers separately 
contribute code for the software of an autonomous vehicle, but the two contributions 
unforeseeably interact in ways that cause the vehicle to deliberately collide with individuals 
                                                        
52 See supra notes 22-37. 
53 See Part V.A. 
54 Jeff Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 
WAKE FORREST J. L. & POLICY 393, 433 (2015) (discussing crimes applicable to this scenario).  
55 See infra Part V. 
56 See discussion below on constructive liability offenses (Part V.A).  
57 In 2017, for instance, more than 4,500 Microsoft employees contributed to open source software hosted on 
GitHub. Matt Asay, Who really contributes to open source, INFOWORLD (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.infoworld.com/article/3253948/open-source-tools/who-really-contributes-to-open-
source.html#tk.twt_ifw. GitHub is a development platform that hosts open source code. Frederic Lardinois, et al., 
Microsoft has acquired GitHub for $7.5B in stock, TECHCRUNCH (June 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/04/microsoft-has-acquired-github-for-7-5b-in-microsoft-stock/. 
58 See Lothar Determann & Bruce Perens, Open Cars, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 915 (2017). 
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wearing striped shirts. If this was the result of some not-reasonably-foreseeable interactions 
between the two programmers’ contributions, then presumably neither programmer would have 
criminal liability. Generally, to be criminally liable, an individual has to intend a certain 
prohibited socially undesirable outcome—or at least act recklessly, which is acting despite being 
aware of a substantial and unjustified risk that one’s conduct may produce a prohibited 
outcome.59  Sometimes, although more controversially,60 criminal liability can be imposed on a 
negligence basis when one causes harm that a reasonable person would have foreseen and taken 
precautions to avoid.61 At least in a case where AI activity has, from the perspective of a 
reasonable person, unforeseeably caused harm, individuals would not generally face criminal 
liability, as this would not even meet the threshold for criminal negligence. In some cases, they 
would not even be civilly liable if their actions were not negligent under the tort standard.62  
  
There are several possible grounds on which the criminal law might deem AI crime to be 
irreducible.63  
 
1) Enforcement Problems: A bad actor is responsible for an AI crime, but the individual 
cannot be identified by law enforcement. For example, this might be the case where the 
creator of a computer virus has managed to remain anonymous. 
 
2) Practical Irreducibility: It would be impractical for legal institutions to seek to reduce the 
harmful AI conduct to individual human actions, because of the number of people 
involved, the difficulty in determining how they contributed to the AI’s design, or 
because they were active far away or long ago.  Criminal law inquiries do not extend 
indefinitely for a variety of sound reasons.64  
 
3) Legal Irreducibility: Even if the law could reduce the AI crime to a set of individual 
human actions, it may be bad criminal law policy to do so. For example, unjustified risks 
might not be substantial enough to warrant being criminalized. Perhaps multiple 
individuals acted carelessly in insubstantial ways, but their acts synergistically led to AI 
causing significant harm. In such cases, the law might deem the AI’s conduct to be 
irreducible for reasons of criminalization policy.  
 
We will largely set aside enforcement-based reasons for irreducibility as less interesting from 
a legal design perspective. Enforcement problems exist without AI. Other forms of irreducibility 
may exist, such as moral irreducibility, but we will not focus on these here because they are 
controversial and undertheorized.65 
                                                        
59 Model Penal Code, 2.02(2)(a)-(c) (defining purpose and recklessness). 
60 LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY (2009) (arguing there should be no criminal 
liability for negligence).  
61 Model Penal Code, 2.02(2)(d) (defining negligence).  
62 Developers may be civilly liable other than under tortious negligence. For instance, if it were a defective 
commercial “product,” its supplier might be subject to strict products liability. Abbott, supra note 47 at 13–16 
(discussing product liability law).  However, such liability only applies in limited situations. Id. 
63 See Part IV.A.2. 
64 See Section IV.B.1 (discussing the reducibility challenge as applied to corporate liability).  
65 It’s conceivable the law might adopt a “moral irreducibility” view. That is, law might deem an AI (perhaps 
incorrectly) to be a full-blown moral agent, i.e., genuinely responsible for its conduct, and for that reason the law 
might regard its conduct as irreducible. However, while this might be logically possible, we have doubts about it—
especially if sufficient creativity is used to identify bad human behavior nearby. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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Instead, our analysis will focus on what we take to be less controversial forms of 
irreducibility: those where it is not practically feasible to reduce the harmful AI conduct to 
human actors or where the harmful AI conduct was just the result of human misconduct too 
trivial to penalize. In these instances, AI can be seen as autonomously committing crimes in 
irreducible ways, where there is no responsible person. This is what we refer to as “Hard AI 
Crime” and what we take to provide the strongest case for holding AI criminally liable in its own 
right.  
 
C. A Mainstream Theory of Punishment  
 
To anchor our analysis, this section introduces a theory of punishment that reflects the broad 
consensus in the literature.66 We use the term “punishment” roughly as defined by HLA Hart in 
terms of five elements: 
 
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. 
(ii) It must be for an offense against legal rules. 
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence. 
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender. 
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against 
which the offence is committed.67 
 
Thus, “punishment” requires a conviction for a legally recognized offense following accepted 
procedures.68 Imprisonment, fines or asset forfeiture carried out in response to a proper 
conviction for a specified offense would count as punishment, but a range of other activities that 
most people might consider “punishment” in a loose sense would not.69  For instance, harsh 
treatment by private citizens for violating informal social norms, preventative detention of the 
insane on grounds of their being a danger to themselves or others, or asset forfeiture carried out 
in advance of a conviction would not count as punishment.70 Civil penalties, while violations of 
legal norms, do not count as an “offense” for criminal law purposes, as the criminal law seeks to 
condemn egregious categories of conduct.71  
 
                                                        
66 Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
144 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (noting the convergence on this sort of theory of punishment). 
67 HLA Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, 2nd ed. 4-5 (2008).   
68 This is likewise supported by the principle of legality, built into any well-functioning legal system. This principle 
(nulla poena sin lege) provides that it is not legally permitted to penalize someone for an action without a law 
prohibiting that conduct. Douglas N. Husak and Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal 
Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29 (1994). 
69 Id. at 5. 
70 It remains open, on this definition, whether mere arrest is itself a form of punishment. It is properly carried out 
only in response to a suspected criminal offense, although it is in advance of a conviction and therefore it is unclear 
whether it satisfies the "imposed for an offense" requirement in (i). As Hart notes, these may be punishment-like in 
some respects, but do not fall within the core concept of punishment. Hart, supra note 67 at 5.  
71 To deem some conduct an offense is to condemn it, to mark it out as culpable and to label the one who commits it 
an offender. See Duff, infra note 96. The expression of condemnation and declaring someone convicted of a crime to 
be an offender who is guilty is a feature of core punishment, but not civil liability. Because Hart’s definition is 
couched in terms like “offense” and “offender,” carrying as they do connotations of culpability and condemnation, 
civil liability would not qualify as punishment.  
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Punishment is justified only if its affirmative justifications outweigh its costs and it does not 
otherwise offend applicable negative limitations. Affirmative justifications are the positive 
benefits that punishment might produce like harm reduction, increased safety, enhanced 
wellbeing, or expressing a commitment to core moral or political values. Such benefits can give 
reason to criminalize certain types of conduct and impose sanctions on actors who perform acts 
of those types. Affirmative justifications are distinct from negative limitations on punishment. 
These are commonly associated with culpability-focused retributivist views of the criminal law. 
For example, it widely held to be unjust to punish the innocent—or punish wrongdoers in excess 
of what they deserve in virtue of their culpability—even if this would promote aggregate 
wellbeing in society.72 This so-called “desert constraint” imposes a limitation, grounded in 
justice, on promoting social welfare through punishment.73 
 
1) Affirmative Reasons to Punish 
 
It is common to be a pluralist about the benefits of punishment.74 U.S. Federal law refers to 
the most widely acknowledged benefits, including the need to “afford deterrence to criminal 
conduct,” to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” to “provide the defendant 
with” rehabilitative treatment of various kinds, as well as to reflect “the seriousness of the 
offense” which covers the culpability of the act and the desert of the actor.75 
 
For simplicity, the affirmative aims of punishment can be grouped into two main categories: 
a) consequentialist aims and b) retributivist aims. Some theorists also mention c) expressive 
aims, though these largely reduce to other aims in the first two categories.76 Consequentialist 
benefits cover the good consequences that punishment can bring about, usually understood as 
enhancing the aggregate well-being of the members of society by reducing harm. The main type 
of consequentialist benefit of punishment is preventive, in that punishment can reduce crime.  
 
Punishment can reduce crime several ways. The simplest is incapacitation: when the 
offender is locked up, he or she is physically limited from committing further crimes while 
incarcerated.77 The next and arguably most important way punishment prevents harm is through 
deterrence—namely by threatening negative consequences for the commission of a crime that 
give would-be offenders reasons to refrain from prohibited conduct.78 Deterrence comes in two 
forms: i) specific deterrence and ii) general deterrence. Specific deterrence is the process 
whereby punishing a specific individual discourages that person from committing more crime in 
                                                        
72 See infra notes 90-92. 
73 Id. 
74 Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY, Mark D. White 
ed., (2011) (“many have proposed a hybrid model of ‘limiting retributivism’ that explicitly purports to combine 
aspects of both the canonical theories” of consequentialism and retributivism; suggesting that “the ascendant view of 
punishment is more openly pluralistic about its purposes”); Berman, infra note 66 at 141-42 (noting “converg[ence] 
on a desert-constrained pluralism” about the justifications of punishment; describing it as “something approaching a 
consensus” view). 
75 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
76 Berman, infra note 66 at 148 (discussing whether expressivism reduces to consequentialism).  
77 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Consequentialist Accounts, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/#PurConPun  (under consequentialist accounts, “[i]t is 
commonly suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential 
offenders”). 
78 Id.  
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the future.79 General deterrence occurs when punishing an offender discourages other would-be 
offenders from committing crimes.80 It is a matter of punishing an offender in order to “send a 
message” to other potential offenders. There can be affirmative benefits to punishing the insane 
because it may deter sane individuals from committing crimes and attempting to rely on an 
insanity defense.81 
 
These are not the only kinds of consequentialist benefits that can support punishment. 
Besides incapacitation and deterrence, punishment can reduce harm through 3) rehabilitation of 
the offender.82 Insofar as punishment helps the offender to see the error of his or her ways, or 
training or skills are provided during incarceration, this, too, can help prevent future crimes. 
 
Besides crime prevention, there also may be non-consequentialist benefits that can provide 
additional affirmative grounds for punishment. Most importantly, it may be intrinsically valuable 
to give culpable actors what they deserve in a way that does not just reduce to the value of harm 
reduction.83 In other words, the idea is that retribution, giving offenders what they are due in 
virtue of the culpability of what they did, is intrinsically valuable or fitting.84 Retribution matters, 
for example, because it allows society to sufficiently distance itself from the offender’s 
wrongdoing and prevents it from being complicit (or overly tolerant) of culpable wrongdoing.85 
 
While virtually everyone agrees that the good consequences of preventing crime must be a 
major part of what justifies punishment,86 there is more debate about whether retributivist 
reasons also exist.87 While retributivist reasons for punishment are worth taking seriously, here 
we assume that the lion’s share of the affirmative case in favor of punishment will involve harm 
reduction and similar desirable consequences. 
 
One last group of affirmative reasons that merit mention are expressive reasons.88 
Punishment involves the communication of society’s collective commitment to certain core 
                                                        
79 Berman, infra note 66 at 145 (discussing types of deterrence). 
80 Id.  
81 Hart offered this response to Bentham’s argument that because children and the insane are not deterrable, they 
should not be punished. Hart argues more soberly that “though…the threat of punishment could not have operated 
on [children or the insane], the actual infliction of punishment on those persons, may secure a higher measure of 
conformity to law on the part of normal persons.” Hart, supra note 67 at 19. While there are other reasons for not 
punishing children and the insane (i.e. reduced culpability), Bentham’s “undeterrability” argument is not a 
convincing reason.    
82 Berman, infra note 66 (discussing rehabilitation). 
83 To illustrate, suppose punishing a murderer will do absolutely nothing to prevent future crime or reduce harm to 
others. Maybe the offense was committed decades ago and the offender is now too infirm to reoffend. Suppose the 
punishment is guaranteed to remain a complete secret from the public. Punishment would thus not result in specific 
or general deterrence, but there may still be a retributive reason to punish. The reason would stem from the value (if 
any) inherent in giving offenders what they are due in virtue of their culpability. 
84 John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 29, 1979; VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF 
HARM 26 (2011) (identifying retributivism with the claim that it is “intrinsically valuable” that offenders suffer in 
proportion to their desert); Doug Husak, Retributivism in Extremis, 32 L. & Philosophy 3 (2013) (defending broader 
versions of retributivism). 
85 Leora Katz, Response Retributivism: Defending the Duty to Punish (draft), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264139. 
86 Tadros, supra note 84 (ch. 2). 
87 See e.g., id. ch. 4. 
88 ANTONY DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME (2007). 
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values. The state, through punishment, conveys official condemnation of culpable conduct 
through the mechanism of a criminal conviction. This can benefit victims psychologically to see 
the state reaffirm their rights which were violated by a criminal act. Officially expressing 
condemnation of culpable conduct may also affect behavior and attitudes in general by 
reinforcing positive social values.89  
 
Some question whether expressive benefits are a distinct category of reason to punish, or 
whether they simply reduce to consequentialist or retributivist reasons.90 After all, many of the 
benefits in the expressive category center around harm prevention, such as the deterrent effects 
of signaling that society will not stand for seriously culpable conduct. Expressive reasons might 
also reduce also to retributivist reasons insofar as the value of expressing condemnation is that it 
involves giving offenders their due. In what follows, we assume expressive benefits reduce to 
consequentialist or retributive reasons, but not much turns on it. Our arguments are also 
compatible with the contrary view. 
 
2) Negative (Retributive) Limitations 
 
Punishment also should not violate deeply held normative commitments such as justice or 
fairness. The most important of these limitations focus on the culpability of those subject to the 
criminal law. One such limitation on punishment is the desert constraint, which figures into most 
retributivist views.91 The desert constraint is the claim that an offender may not, in justice, be 
punished in excess of his or her desert. Desert, in turn, is understood mainly in terms of the 
culpability one incurs in virtue of one’s conduct. The main effect of the desert constraint is to 
rule out punishments that go beyond what is proportionate to one’s culpability.92 Thus, it would 
be wrong to execute someone for jaywalking even if doing so would ultimately save lives by 
reducing illegal and dangerous pedestrian crossings.  
 
What supports the desert constraint? Intuition, for one thing. It seems unjust to punish 
someone who is completely innocent even if it would produce significant benefits through 
general deterrence.93 Similarly, it seems unjust to impose a very severe punishment on someone 
who only committed a minor crime. Beyond its intuitive plausibility, the desert constraint is also 
supported by the argument—tracing back at least to Kant—that it is wrong to use people merely 
as a means to one’s ends without also treating them as ends in themselves (i.e., without 
respecting their value as persons).94 Punishing the innocent to obtain broader social benefits is a 
paradigmatic example of treating people merely as means. It fails to show individuals the respect 
they are due. Under some Kantian views, the desert constraint is absolute. It is not appropriate to 
treat someone merely as a means to one’s ends regardless of the costs of respecting their value as 
                                                        
89 See Robinson, infra note 112. 
90 Berman, infra note 66 at 148. 
91 See id. at 144 (on retributivism, punishment is justified if, but only to the extent that, “it is deserved or otherwise 
fitting, right or appropriate, and not [necessarily because of] any good consequences” it may have”); see also id. at 
151 (discussing desert-constrained consequentialism). 
92 Negative retributivism is the view that the desert of the offender only prohibits punishing in excess of desert (even 
if it has good consequences). Positive retributivism says that the offender’s desert provides an affirmative reason for 
punishment.  
93 Cf. Hart, supra note 67 at 11 (discussing the famous example of the small southern town). 
94 See, e.g., Tadros, supra note 86, ch. 6 (defending a version of the means principle).  
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persons. Others have a more nuanced view, such that violating a negative limitation could be 
overall justified if the benefits were sufficiently weighty.95  
 
There are limitations on punishment other than the desert constraint. Most importantly, the 
criminal law requires certain prerequisites, such as capacity for culpability, that defendants must 
meet in order to be properly subject to punishment. It is a fundamental aim of the criminal law to 
condemn culpable wrongdoing, and it is the default position in criminal law doctrine that 
punishment may only be properly imposed in response to culpable wrongdoing.96 Without the 
requisite capacities of deliberation and agency, an entity is not an appropriate subject for 
criminal punishment—as can be seen from the fact that lacking such capacities altogether can 
give rise to an incapacity defense.97 Thus, capacity for culpability is an eligibility requirement for 
being aptly subject to regulation by the criminal law.  
 
3)  Alternatives to Punishment 
 
For punishment to be justified, it is not enough for it to have affirmative benefits and to be 
consistent with the negative limitations for punishment. In addition, there cannot be better, 
feasible alternatives, including doing nothing. This is an obvious point that is built into policy 
analysis of all kinds.98  
 
Even if punishing AI has affirmative benefits, and even if the practice did not seriously 
violate any negative limitations, it still would not be justified if, for example, civil liability, 
licensure, or industry standards provide a better solution. It is often claimed that when seeking to 
exert social control, criminal law should be a tool of last resort.99 After all, criminal law 
sanctions are the harshest form of penalty society has available, involving as they do both the 
possible revocation of personal freedom as well as the official condemnation of the offender. 
Thus, the third requirement for a given punishment to be justified is the absence of better 
alternatives.  
 
4)  Putting the Pieces Together 
 
Determining whether a given punishment is appropriate requires investigation of three 
questions:  
 
                                                        
95 Hart, supra note 67 at 12 (“In extreme cases many might think it right to resort to these expedients but we should 
do so with the sense of sacrificing an important principle.”). 
96 See MODEL PENAL CODE, §1.02(c) (1962) (declaring that one of the “general purposes” of the Code is “to 
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal”); Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, To 
Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES, 
665 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqv012 (observing that on retributivist theories, “punishment is only 
justified if the condition of responsible agency is met”); ANTONY DUFF, THE REALM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 19-20 
(2019) (“censure…is essential to a criminal conviction”; a legal system “that criminalizes conduct that is not even 
alleged to be or portrayed as being wrongful is, necessarily, a perversion of criminal law”). 
97 MPC § 4.01 (1962) (outlining incapacity defense based on mental defect causing him to be unable “either to 
appreciate the criminality…of his conduct or to conform [it to] the law”). 
98 Sven Hansson, Philosophical Problems in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 ECON. & PHILOSOPHY 163, 164(2007) (“In 
cost-benefit analysis, an alternative is not evaluated by itself but in comparison to other alternatives (or, at least, in 
comparison to not choosing that alternative).”). 
99 Doug Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207 (2004). 
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a) Affirmative Benefits: Are there sufficiently strong affirmative reasons in favor of 
punishment? This chiefly concerns consequentialist benefits of harm reduction but may 
also include retributive and expressive benefits. 
 
b) Culpability-Focused Negative Limitations: Would punishment be consistent with 
applicable negative limitations? This primarily concerns culpability-focused principles 
like the desert constraint as well as basic prerequisites of apt criminal punishment such as 
capacity for culpability.  
 
c) Feasible Alternatives: Is punishment a better response to the harms or wrongs in question 
than alternatives like civil liability or regulation or doing nothing? 
 
In what follows, we will apply this theory to investigate whether the direct punishment of AI 
is justified. We will begin in Part III with the question of Affirmative Benefits, consider 
Negative Limitations in Part IV, then Feasible Alternatives in Part V.  
 
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE 
 
This Part considers the affirmative benefits that might be adduced to support punishing AI. 
The discussion focuses primarily on consequentialist benefits. Even if retribution can also count 
in favor of punishment, we assume that such benefits would be less important than 
consequentialist considerations centering on harm reduction.100 This Part does not aim to 
completely canvass the benefits of punishing AI. Instead, it argues that punishing AI could 
produce at least some significant affirmative benefits. 
 
A. Consequentialist Benefits 
 
Recall that, arguably, the paramount aim of punishment is to reduce harmful criminal activity 
through deterrence. Thus, a preliminary objection to punishing AI is that it will not produce any 
affirmative harm-reduction benefits because AI is not deterrable. Peter Asaro argues that 
“deterrence only makes sense when moral agents are capable of recognizing the similarity of 
their potential choices and actions to those of other moral agents who have been punished for the 
wrong choices and actions—without this…recognition of similarity between and among moral 
agents, punishment cannot possibly result in deterrence.”101 The idea is that if AIs, given current 
designs, are not able to detect and respond to criminal law sanctions in a way that renders them 
deterrable, there would be nothing to affirmatively support punishing AI. It is likely true that AI, 
as currently operated and envisioned, will not be responsive to punishment, although responsive 
AI is theoretically possible.102 
 
                                                        
100 Tadros, supra note 84. 
101 Peter Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE 
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 181 (2011). Asaro is ultimately skeptical of punishing robots 
because of questions about how to make AI be directly responsive to punishments. See id. at 182.  
102 AIs could in principle be programmed to follow court orders or adapt their behavior in response to a conviction. 
This may be a less effective way to ensure AI lawfulness, however, than programming the AI ex ante not to run 
afoul of criminal law. This will be more challenging with criminal laws that are standards rather than simple rules. It 
is comparatively easy to program a self-driving car not to run a red light than it is to not run a red light except in 
unspecified emergency conditions. 
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The answer to the undeterrability argument requires distinguishing specific deterrence from 
general deterrence.103 Specific deterrence involves incentivizing a particular defendant not to 
commit crimes in the future.104 By contrast, general deterrence involves incentivizing other 
actors besides the defendant from committing crimes. We must further distinguish two types of 
general deterrence: deterring others from committing offenses of the same type the defendant 
was convicted of, offense-relative general deterrence, and deterring others from committing 
crimes in general, unrestricted general deterrence. 
 
The crucial point, then, is that punishing AI could provide general deterrence. Presumably, it 
will not produce offense-relative general deterrence to other AIs, as such systems are not 
designed to be sensitive to criminal law prohibitions and sanctions. Nonetheless, AI punishment 
could produce unrestricted general deterrence.  That is to say, direct punishment of AI could 
provide unrestricted general deterrence as against the developers, owners, or users of AI and 
provide incentives for them to avoid creating AIs that cause especially egregious types of harm 
without excuse or justification. Depending on the penalty associated with punishment, such as 
destruction of an AI, what Mark Lemley and Brian Casey have termed the “robot death 
penalty,"105 punishing AI directly could deprive such developers, owners or users of the financial 
benefits of the systems they would otherwise obtain, thus incentivizing them to modify their 
behavior in socially desirable ways. The deterrence effect may be stronger if capitalization 
requirements are associated with some forms of AI in the future, or if penalties associated with 
punishment are passed on to, for example, an AI’s owner. 
 
B. Expressive Considerations 
 
Punishment of AI may also have expressive benefits.106 Expressing condemnation of the 
harms suffered by the victims of an AI could provide these victims with a sense of satisfaction 
and vindication. Christina Mulligan has defended the idea that punishing robots can generate 
victim-satisfaction benefits, arguing that, “taking revenge against wrongdoing robots, 
specifically, may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots 
harm.”107 On her view, “robot punishment—or more precisely, revenge against robots—
primarily advances…the creation of psychological satisfaction in robots’ victims.”108 Punishment 
conveys a message of official condemnation that could reaffirm the interests, rights and 
ultimately the value of the victims of the harmful AI.109 This, in turn, could produce an increased 
sense of security among victims and society in general. 
                                                        
103 Hart, supra note 67 at 19.  
104 See supra notes 79-80. 
105 Mark A. Lemley, and Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots (July 31, 2018). STANFORD LAW AND ECONOMICS OLIN 
WORKING PAPER NO. 523, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223621. 
106 Analogous considerations could apply to provide support for punishing inanimate objects and corporations. 
107 Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S. Carolina. L. Rev. 579, 580 (2018); cf. David Lewis, The 
Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 54 (1989) (discussing but rejecting the idea 
of defending puzzling features of the criminal law on the ground that when harm results the population may 
“demand blood”). 
108 Mulligan, supra note 107 at 593 
109 Duff, supra note 88; Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 713, 733 
(2008) (“We punish not only in order to admonish the offender…but also…to show the victim our own respect. If 
so, we are punishing harm for a purpose that transcends doing justice to the offender.”); Jack Boeglin and Zachary 
Shapiro, A Theory of Differential Punishment, 70 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1499 (2017) (arguing that victims’ interests 
should be taken “into account when determining how severely criminal offenders should be punished”). 
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This sort of expressivist argument in favor of punishing AI may seem especially forceful in 
light of empirical work demonstrating the human tendency to anthropomorphize and attribute 
mentality to artificial persons like corporations.110 The same sorts of tendencies are likely to be 
even more powerful for AI-enabled robots that are specifically designed to seem human enough 
to elicit emotional responses from humans.111 In the corporate context, some theorists argue that 
corporations should be punished because the law should reflect lay perceptions of praise and 
blame, “folk morality,” or else risk losing its perceived legitimacy.112 This sort of argument, if it 
succeeds for corporate punishment, is likely to be even more forceful as applied to punishing AI, 
which often are deliberately designed to piggy-back on the innate tendency to 
anthropomorphize.113 Were the law to fail to express condemnation of robot-generated harms 
despite robots being widely perceived as blameworthy (even if this is ultimately a mistaken 
perception), this could erode the perception of the legitimacy of the criminal law. Thus, a number 
of benefits could be obtained through the expressive function of punishment.114  
 
Nonetheless, there are a range of prima facie worries about appealing to expressive benefits 
like victim satisfaction in order to justify the punishment of AI. Punishing AI to placate those 
who want retaliation for AI-generated harms would be akin to giving in to mob justice. 
Legitimizing such reactions could enable populist calls for justice to be pressed more forcefully 
in the future. The mere fact that punishing AI might be popular would not show the practice to 
be just. As David Lewis observed, if it is unjust for the population to “demand blood” in 
response to seeing harm, then satisfying such demands through the law would itself be unjust—
even if “it might be prudent to ignore justice and do their bidding.”115 Simply put, the popularity 
of a practice does not automatically justify it, even if popularity could be relevant to its 
normative justification. Moreover, punishing AI for expressivist purposes could lead to further 
                                                        
110 Mihailis Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2078 (2016) (arguing that 
“When groups exhibit high levels of coherence, as do most corporations, humans perceive them as possessing many 
of the attributes traditionally associated with individuals,” thus rendering “‘blame and punishment [of] these 
groups…psychologically sensible and sustainable’”); id. at 2077-79 (collecting psychology sources). 
111 Luisa Damiano and Paul Dumouchel, Anthropomorphism in Human–Robot Co-evolution, FRONTIERS IN 
PSYCHOLOGY (Mar. 26, 2018), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00468 (discussing “social robotics” which sees 
anthropomorphism not as “a cognitive error” but as a useful tool “to facilitate social interactions between humans 
and…social robots”); Sherry Turkle, In Good Company? On the Threshold of Robotic Companions, in CLOSE 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARTIFICIAL COMPANIONS: KEY SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL AND DESIGN ISSUES 3, 3–
10 (Yorick Wilks ed., 2010); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513 538; 
Matthias Scheutz, The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds Between Humans and Social Robots, in 
ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 205, 205–22 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & 
George A. Bekey eds., 2012). 
112 Diamantis, supra note 110 at 2088-89 (a “criminal legal system that is more responsive to society’s perceptions 
of blameworthiness may foster forces, like respect for and confidence in the law, that ultimately increase compliance 
by individuals. Conversely, ignoring lay perceptions of blameworthiness...threatens to undermine the broader 
effectiveness of the criminal law in preventing crime"); see generally PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND 
THE UTILITY OF DESERT 176-88 (2013). 
113 See, e.g., Margaret Rhodes, The Touchy Task Of Making Robots Seem Human—But Not Too Human, 
WIRED.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/touchy-task-making-robots-seem-human-not-human/.   
114 Some might worry that expressive benefits just are consequentialist reasons to punish AI. While conceptually 
interesting, not much of practical importance turns on this issue for our purposes. 
115 Lewis, supra note 107 at 229. 
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bad behavior that might spill over to the way other humans are treated.116 Thus, Kate Darling has 
argued robots should be protected from cruelty in order to reflect moral norms and prevent 
undesirable human behavior.117 
 
Further, expressing certain messages through punishment may also carry affirmative costs 
which should not be omitted from the calculus. Punishing AI could send the message that AI is 
itself an actor on par with a human being, which is responsible and can be held accountable 
through the criminal justice system. Such a message is concerning, as it could entrench the view 
that AI has rights to certain kinds of benefits, protections and dignities that could restrict 
valuable human activities.  
 
In sum, punishing AI may have affirmative benefits. It could result in general deterrence for 
developers, owners and users, as well as produce expressive benefits (if also potential costs). 
Whether these benefits would provide sufficient justification for punishing AI when compared to 
the feasible alternatives will be discussed in Part V. Before that, we turn to another kind of 
threshold question: whether punishing AI violates the culpability-focused negative limitations on 
punishment.  
 
IV. RETRIBUTIVE LIMITATIONS 
 
This Part considers retributivist (culpability-focused) limitations on punishment. Section A 
asks whether AI can be seen as being the right kind of entity to be eligible for punishment—what 
we call The Eligibility Challenge. Where the criminal law’s fundamental prerequisites are not 
satisfied, its sanctions are not be legitimately deployed. Section B considers two further 
retributivist objections to the punishment of AI. The Reductionist Challenge insists that any 
apparent AI culpability is fully reducible to the actions of persons who are better targets for 
punishment.  This challenge purports to show that there is no need for the direct punishment of 
AI. Finally, the Spillover Objection insists it would be unjust to punish AI if this would 
predictably harm innocent people who develop, own, or use such systems.  
 
We argue that all three of these objections to the punishment of AI admit of answers. Along 
the way, we draw on the literature on corporate punishment and strict liability, where analogs of 
these same objections have been explored. 
 
A. The Eligibility Challenge 
 
                                                        
116 This is similar to Kant’s point that although he thought animals are not strictly speaking moral persons, there are 
still good reasons to discourage the mistreatment of animals because it could embolden people to mistreat other 
human beings. Lori Gruen, The Moral Status of Animals, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ (discussing Kant’s view of ethical treatment of animals; quoting 
Kant’s Lectures in Ethics as stating that if one unfairly harms a dog “he does not fail in his duty to the 
dog…but…[he] must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his 
dealings with men” ([1784–5] 1997: 212 [Ak 27: 459])”). 
117 Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and 
Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213, 215 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian 
Kerr eds., 2016). Relatedly, in the United Kingdom, laws criminalizing animal cruelty exist to disapprove of 
offensive human conduct. Animal Welfare Act 2006 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/45/contents. 
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The Eligibility Challenge is simple to state: AI, like other inanimate objects, is not the right 
kind of thing to be punished. It lacks mental states and the deliberative capacities needed for 
culpability, so it cannot be punished without sacrificing core commitments of the criminal law. 
The issue is not that AI punishment would be unfair to AI. AIs are not conscious, do not feel (at 
least in the phenomenal sense),118 and do not possess interests or wellbeing.119 Therefore, there is 
no reason to think AI gets the benefit of the protections of the desert constraint, which prohibits 
punishment in excess of what culpability merits.120 The Eligibility Challenge does not derive 
from the desert constraint.  
 
Instead, the Eligibility Challenge, properly construed, comes in one narrow and one broad 
form. The narrow version is that, as a mere machine, AI lacks mental states and thus cannot 
fulfill the mental state (mens rea) elements built into most criminal offenses. Therefore, 
convicting AI of crimes requiring a mens rea like intent, knowledge or recklessness would 
violate the principle of legality. This principle stems from general rule of law values and holds 
that it would be contrary to law to convict a defendant of a crime unless it is proved (following 
applicable procedures and by the operative evidentiary standard) that the defendant satisfied all 
the elements of the crime.121 If punishing AI violates the principle of legality, it threatens the rule 
of law and could weaken the public trust in the criminal law.  
 
The broad form of the challenge holds that because AI lacks the capacity to deliberate and 
weigh reasons, AI cannot possess broad culpability of the sort the criminal law aims to respond 
to.122 A fundamental purpose of the criminal law is to condemn culpable wrongdoing, as it is at 
least the default position in criminal law doctrine that punishment may be properly imposed only 
in response to culpable wrongdoing.123 The capacity for culpable conduct thus is a general 
prerequisite of the criminal law, and failing to meet it would remove the entity in question from 
the ambit of proper punishment—a fact that is encoded in law, for example, in incapacity 
defenses like infancy and insanity. Thus, the broad version of the Eligibility Challenge holds that 
because AI lacks the practical reasoning capacities needed for being culpable, AI does not fall 
within the scope of the criminal law. Punishing AI despite its lack of capacity would not only be 
conceptually confused, but would fail to serve the retributive aims of the criminal law—namely, 
to mark out seriously culpable conduct for the strictest public condemnation.  
 
Here we develop three answers to the Eligibility Challenge.  
 
                                                        
118 David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, http://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf (describing 
phenomenal experiences as those personally felt or experienced).  
119 Id. (discussing the hard problem of consciousness).  
120 Supra notes 90-92.  
121 See Husak, supra note 68. 
122 See Doug Husak, ‘Broad’ Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449 (2012) 
(distinguishing narrow culpability as merely mens rea categories from broad culpability, which is the underlying 
normative defect that the criminal law aims to respond to).  
123 See supra note 96; see also MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 35 (1997) (arguing for a presumption in favor of 
punishing “all and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful action”); Duff, supra 
note 96 (a legal system “that criminalizes conduct that is not even alleged to be…wrongful is, necessarily, a 
perversion of criminal law”). While strict liability crimes exist, these are only justified in exceptional circumstances 
and are otherwise unjust. W. Robert Thomas, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for 
Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral World, 110 MICH. L. REV., 647, 647-50 (2012). 
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1. Answer 1: Respondeat Superior 
 
The simplest answer to the Eligibility Challenge has been deployed with respect to 
corporations. Corporations are artificial entities that might also be thought ineligible for 
punishment because they are incapable of being culpable in their own right.124 However, even if 
corporations cannot literally satisfy mens rea elements, the criminal law has developed doctrines 
that allow culpable mental states to be imputed to corporations. The most important such 
doctrinal tool is respondeat superior, which allows mental states possessed by an agent of the 
corporation to be imputed to the corporation itself provided that the agent was acting within the 
scope of her employment and in furtherance of corporate interests.125 Some jurisdictions also 
tack on further requirements.126 Since imputation principles of this kind are well-understood and 
legally accepted, thus letting actors guide their behavior accordingly, respondeat superior makes 
it possible for corporations to be convicted of crimes without violating the principle of 
legality.127  
 
If this kind of legal construction of mental states is a promising mechanism by which 
corporations can be brought back within the ambit of proper punishment and avoid the Eligibility 
Challenge, the same legal device could be used to make AI eligible for punishment. The culpable 
mental states of AI developers, owners, or users could be imputed to the AI under certain 
circumstances pursuant to a respondeat superior theory.128 
 
It may be more difficult to use respondeat superior to answer the Eligibility Challenge for AI 
than for corporations—at least in cases of Hard AI Crime. Unlike a corporation, which is literally 
composed of the humans acting on its behalf, an AI is not guaranteed to come with a ready 
supply of identifiable human actors whose mental states can be imputed. This is not to say there 
will not also be many garden-variety cases where an AI does have a clear group of human 
developers. Most AI applications are likely to fall within this category and so respondeat 
superior would at least be a partial route to making AI eligible for punishment. Of course, in 
many of these cases when there are identifiable people whose mental states could be imputed to 
the AI—such as developers or owners who intended the AI to cause harm—criminal law will 
                                                        
124 See e.g. Albert Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1359 (2009) (arguing against corporate punishment). 
125 Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability: Analyzing the 
Divergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 157 (2009) (“respondeat superior has been the 
most traditionally accepted method of imputing criminal liability to a corporation”); Eli Lederman, Models for 
Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-
Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 654-55 (2000) (under respondeat superior, “a corporation is liable for the deeds 
of any of its agents or employees…as long as…[t]he agent was acting within the course and scope of his or her 
employment, having the authority to act for the corporation…at least in part in furtherance of the corporation’s 
business interests” (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)). 
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (adopting respondeat superior but restricting it to the mental states of high 
corporate officials). 
127 Granted, this is a legal fiction. But the principle of legality does not obviously require that corporations 
literally—as opposed to legally—satisfy the mens rea element. Paul Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE 
L. J. 609 (1984). Even if one thinks imputation principles are in tension with the principle of legality, strictly 
construed, the costs we normally fear from violating it—like weakening public trust in the criminal law—are not 
likely to be very serious. So even if corporations’ literal lack of mental states were to remain a formalistic problem 
for corporate punishment, it would be a very weighty one. 
128 See Hallevy, supra note 12 at 201 (arguing “there is no substantive legal difference between the idea of criminal 
liability imposed on corporations and on AI entities”). 
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already have tools at its disposal to impose liability on these culpable human actors. In these 
cases, there is less likely to be a need to impose direct AI criminal liability. 
 
Thus, while respondeat superior can help mitigate the Eligibility Challenge for AI 
punishment in many cases, this unlikely to be an adequate response in cases of Hard AI Crime.  
 
2. Answer 2: Strict Liability 
 
A different sort of response to the Eligibility Challenge is to look for ways to punish AI 
despite its not literally possessing culpable mental states. That is not to simply reach for a 
consequentialist justification of the conceptual confusion or inaptness involved in applying 
criminal law to AI. Within the criminal law, we take this to be a justificatory strategy of last 
resort—especially given the blunt form of consequentialism it relies on. Rather, what is needed is 
a method of cautiously extending the criminal law to AI that would not entail weighty violations 
of the principle of legality.  
 
One way to do this would be to establish a range of new strict liability offenses specifically 
for AI crimes—i.e., offenses that an AI could commit even in the absence of any mens rea like 
intent to cause harm, knowledge of an inculpatory fact, reckless disregard of a risk or negligent 
unawareness of a risk. In this sense, the AI would be subject to liability without “fault.” This 
would permit punishment of AI in the absence of mental states. Accordingly, strict liability 
offenses may be one familiar route by which to impose criminal liability on an AI without 
sacrificing the principle of legality.  
 
Many legal scholars are highly critical of strict liability offenses. As Duff argues, strict 
criminal liability amounts to unjustly punishing the innocent:  
 
That is why we should object so strongly (…): the reason is not (only) that people are 
then subjected to the prospect of material burdens that they had no fair opportunity to 
avoid, but that they are unjustly portrayed and censured as wrongdoers, or that their 
conduct is unjustly portrayed and condemned as wrong.129  
 
Yet this normative objection applies with greatest force to persons. The same injustice does not 
threaten strict criminal liability offenses for AI because AI does not obviously enjoy the 
protections of the desert constraint130 (which prohibits punishment in excess of culpability).131 
 
This strategy is not without problems. Even to be guilty of a strict liability offense, 
defendants still must satisfy the voluntary act requirement.132 LaFave’s criminal law treatise 
observes that “a voluntary act is an absolute requirement for criminal liability.”133 The Model 
                                                        
129 Duff, supra note 96 at 19. 
130 There may be unfairness to adjacent innocent people who own or rely on the AI, but that is a separate problem 
which afflicts any punishment. See Part IV.B. 
131 Matters would be different if AIs, perhaps like many animals, could experience pleasure and pain, or were 
conscious or otherwise in possession morally salient interests. It would indeed seem unfair to subject animals to 
extreme suffering just for general deterrent benefits (if not as unfair as for a human being). 
132 WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 6.1(c) (3d ed.) (“criminal liability requires that the activity in question be 
voluntary”). 
133 Id.   
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Penal Code, for example, holds that a “person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is 
based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is 
physically capable.”134 Behaviors like reflexes, convulsions or movements that occur 
unconsciously or while sleeping are expressly ruled out as non-voluntary.135 To be a voluntary 
act, “only bodily movements guided by conscious mental representations count”.136 If AI cannot 
have mental states and is incapable of deliberation and reasoning, it is not clear how any of its 
behavior can be deemed to be a voluntary act.  
 
There are ways around this problem. The voluntary act requirement might be altered (or 
outright eliminated) by statute for the proposed class of strict liability offenses that only AI can 
commit. Less dramatically, even within existing criminal codes, it is possible to define certain 
absolute duties of non-harmfulness that AI defendants would have to comply with or else be 
guilty by omission of a strict liability offense. The Model Penal Code states that an offense 
cannot be based on an omission to act unless the omission is expressly recognized by statute or 
“a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.”137 A statutory amendment 
imposing affirmative duties on AI to avoid certain kinds of harmful conduct is all it would take 
to enable an AI to be strictly liable on an omission theory.  
 
Of course, this may also carry costs. Given that one central aim of the criminal law is usually 
taken to be responding to and condemning culpable conduct, if AI is punished on a strict liability 
basis, this might risk diluting the public meaning and value of the criminal law.138 That is, it 
threatens to undermine the expressive benefits that supposedly help justify punishing AI in the 
first place.139 This is another potential cost to punishing AI that must be weighed against its 
benefits.  
 
3. Answer 3: A Framework for Direct Mens Rea Analysis for AI 
 
The last answer is the most speculative. A framework for directly defining mens rea terms for 
AI—analogous to those possessed by natural persons—could be crafted. This could require an 
investigation of AI behavior at the programming level and offer a set of rules that courts could 
apply to determine when an AI possessed a particular mens rea—like intent, knowledge or 
recklessness—or at the very least, when such a mens rea could be legally constructed.140 This 
inquiry could draw on expert testimony about the details of the AI’s code, though it need not. By 
way of analogy, juries assess mental states of human defendants by using common knowledge 
about what mental states (intentions, knowledge, etc.) it takes to make a person behave in the 
                                                        
134 Model Penal Code, § 2.01(1). 
135 Id. § 2.01(2). 
136 Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Yaffe_TheVoluntaryActRequirement.pdf 
137 MPC, § 2.01(3).  
138 See Duff, supra notes 88 and 96 at 19-20.  
139 See supra, Part III. 
140 In IV.A, we discussed respondeat superior as a mode of taking an existing human mental state and carrying it 
over to an AI. This section, by contrast, discusses possible methods of legally constructing AI mental states that no 
person already possesses. Cf. infra note 156 (discussing the collective knowledge doctrine for corporations). 
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observed fashion.141  Similarly in AI cases, experts might need only to testify in broad terms 
about how the relevant type of AI (say, a neural network) functions and how its information-
processing architecture could have generated the observed behavior. Thus, direct mens rea 
analysis for AI could, but need not, require “looking under the hood” at the details of the code. 
Instead, it would be enough to simply guide the legal determination of what mens rea the AI can 
be deemed to possess.  
 
Towards this end a framework is needed to steer decisionmakers in conducting direct mens 
rea analysis for AI, and it must consist of two parts. First, to answer the broad Eligibility 
Challenge, we need a general conception of what it would mean for AI to be culpable in its own 
right. Second, to answer the narrow version of the challenge, we need to offer a set of rules for 
when an AI may be deemed to possess a given mens rea.  
 
To begin with, a coherent concept of AI culpability could be legally constructed in the 
following way. The prevailing theory has it that one is criminally culpable for an action to the 
extent that it manifests insufficient regard for legally protected interests or values.142 These 
protected interests and values provide legally recognized reasons bearing on how to behave. 
Insufficient regard is a form of ill will or indifference that produces mistakes in the way one 
recognizes, weighs and responds to the applicable legal reasons for action.143 The criminal law 
typically does not demand that we are motivated by respect for others, or even respect for law; 
all it demands is that we do not put our disrespect on display by acting in ways that are 
inconsistent with attaching proper weight to protected interests and values. Thus, criminal 
culpability can be seen as being more about what one’s behavior manifests and less about the 
nuances of one’s private motivations, thoughts and feelings.144 There are good institutional-
design reasons—such as clarity, the need for the law to be able to guide the conduct of normal 
citizens, and the demand for the law not to intrude too heavily into the private sphere—for the 
criminal law not to be overly concerned with the specific motives or private mental states 
                                                        
141 Peter Carruthers, Mindreading in Infants, 28 MIND & LANGUAGE 141 (2013) (discussing how infants attribute 
beliefs and intentions to others); David Premack & Guy Woodruff, Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?, 1 
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 515 (1978)  (defining “theory of mind” as the system whereby “the individual 
imputes mental states to himself and to others” and noting that it is “not directly observable [but] can be used to 
make predictions… about the behavior of other organisms”). 
142 LARRY ALEXANDER AND KIMBERLY FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 67-68 (2009) (“insufficient concern [is] the 
essence of culpability”). Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 289, 373-74 (2006) 
(“a person is normatively blameworthy for engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits if he was motivated by an 
attitude of disrespect for the interests that the statute seeks to protect”). See Yaffe, supra note 143; Gideon Yaffe, 
Intoxication, Recklessness, and Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 545, 552-53 (2012); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 250 (2005) (“if [a defendant] is convicted of a serious offence, the state communicates...that [his] 
behaviour manifested an inappropriate regard for other citizens and their interests”). 
143 See, e.g., GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 38 (2011) (an action is culpable to the degree that “it is a product of a faulty 
mode of recognition or response to reasons for action”). Note that legal culpability may or may not be the same as 
moral blameworthiness. Compare Mark Dsouza 2015, p. 453 (distinguishing moral from legal culpability) and Sarch 
supra note 17 with Michael Moore, Choice, character, and excuse, 7 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY 29, 30-31 
(1990) (taking moral and legal culpability to be presumptively the same). We are agnostic on how to understand moral 
blameworthiness, which may be more fine-grained and searching of one’s inner mental states than legal culpability. 
Compare Pete Graham, A Sketch of A Theory of Blameworthiness, 88 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 388, 403 (2014) 
(“[W]hat people are truly blameworthy for are the motivations from which [their] actions spring, rather than the actions 
themselves”) with ARPALY AND SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 170 (2014) (defending a notion of blameworthiness 
that is similar to criminal culpability as described here). Our focus here, regardless, is legal culpability. 
144 See Sarch, supra note 17. 
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involved in law breaking. Thus, as long as one crosses the line and has no affirmative defense, 
we may treat the presumption that one’s illegal action manifests insufficient regard as being 
unrebutted—i.e., as legally conclusive. 
 
By way of analogy, this notion of culpability can account for corporate culpability. If only 
the legal notion of criminal culpability is required for proper punishment, then eligibility for 
punishment requires being capable of behaving in ways that manifest insufficient regard for the 
legally recognized reasons. All that avoiding legal culpability requires is to abstain from actions 
that are reasonably interpreted as disrespectful forms of conduct stemming from a legally 
deficient appreciation of the legal reasons.145 This provides a recipe for how to regard 
corporations as being criminally culpable in their own right. They possess information-gathering, 
reasoning and decision-making procedures in virtue of the hierarchy of employees they are made 
up of. Thus, corporations can be seen as having the capacity for criminal culpability. Through 
their members, they weigh and act on the reasons that the criminal law demands not displaying 
insufficient regard for in action.146 Corporations can engage in conduct that puts on display their 
insufficient regard for the legally recognized interests of others. For example, if a corporation 
learns, through its employees, that its manufacturing processes generate dangerous waste that is 
seeping into the drinking water in the nearby town, this is a legally recognized reason for altering 
its conduct. If the corporation continues its activities unchanged, this demonstrates that it—
through its information-sharing and decision-making procedures—did not end up attaching 
sufficient weight to the legally recognized reasons against continuing its dangerous 
manufacturing activities. This is paradigmatic criminal culpability.147  
 
AI could qualify as criminally culpable in an analogous manner. Sophisticated AI may have 
built-in goals with a greater or lesser autonomy to determine the means of completing those 
goals. AI may gather information, process it and determine the most efficient means to 
accomplishing its goals. Accordingly, the law might deem some AIs to possess the functional 
equivalent of sufficient reasoning and decision-making abilities to manifest insufficient regard. If 
the AI is programmed to be able to take account of the interests of humans and consider legal 
requirements, but ends up behaving in a way that is inconsistent with taking proper account of 
these legally recognized interests and reasons, then the AI can be reasonably seen as manifesting 
insufficient regard—which is to say, be deemed in law to be criminally culpable. 
 
                                                        
145 GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY (2018) (developing evidentialist account of manifestation of 
insufficient regard); see also, Sarch supra note 17. 
146 See W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Punishment, 78 
OHIO ST. L.J. 601, 612-13 (2017) (“[C]orporations are able to function competently in a range of normatively laden 
activities. (...) They can deliberate and act consistent with their self-identified interests and separate from outside 
pressures. Corporations are willing participants in…our normative practices, even if they may not be objects of moral 
consideration in…themselves. For example, through contract law, corporations routinely participate in a normatively 
laden practice akin to promising.”); CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILLIP PETIT, GROUP AGENCY 158-63 (2011) (arguing that 
corporations can have decision-making structures that satisfy the main preconditions for responsibility). 
147 One might object that a corporation’s practical reasoning and decision-making capacities merely derive from, or 
are composed out of, those of the corporation’s members. However, this is merely a worry about reducibility, discussed 
below. See Part IV.B. It does not undermine corporations’ threshold eligibility for punishment. Thomas, supra note 
146 (if “corporate attitudes derive from the contributions of individuals who themselves are uncontroversially moral 
agents…it would be surprising that every emergent corporate attitude would be stripped of normative content”). 
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This gives a flavor of how criminal culpability might broadly be understood for AI, but we 
still need a framework for determining when sophisticated AIs can be said to possess a 
functional analog of a standard mens rea like purpose or knowledge. We do not attempt here to 
formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for an AI mens rea, but rather to sketch some 
possible approaches.  
 
Work in philosophy of action characterizing the functional roles of an intention in a person 
could be extended to AI. Consider Bratman’s well-known account.148 On his view, actors who 
intend (i.e. act with the purpose) to bring about an outcome “guide [their] conduct in the 
direction of causing” that outcome.149 This means that “[i]n the normal case, one [who intends an 
outcome] is prepared to make adjustments in what one is doing in response to indications of 
one’s success or failure in promoting” that outcome.150 So if the actor is driving with the 
intention to hit a pedestrian, should the actor detect that conditions have changed so as to require 
behavioral adjustments to make this outcome more likely, an actor with this intention will be 
disposed to make these adjustments. Moreover, an actor with this intention is disposed to 
monitor the circumstances to find ways to increase the likelihood of the intended outcome. 
Merely foreseeing the outcome, but not intending it, does not entail these same forms of guiding 
one’s behavior to promote the outcome (i.e., to make it more likely). This conception of intention 
could be applied to AI.  
 
One conceivable way to argue that an AI (say, an autonomous vehicle) had the intention 
(purpose) to cause an outcome (to harm a pedestrian) would be to ask whether the AI was 
guiding its behavior so as to make this outcome more likely (relative to its background 
probability of occurring). Is the AI monitoring conditions around it to identify ways to make this 
outcome more likely, and is the AI then disposed to make these behavioral adjustments to make 
the outcome more likely (either as a goal in itself or as a means to accomplishing another goal)? 
If so, then the AI may plausibly said to have the purpose of causing that outcome. Carrying out 
this sort of inquiry will of course require extensive and technically challenging expert testimony 
regarding the nature of the programming—and could thus be prohibitively difficult or expensive. 
But it does not seem impossible in principle even if difficult questions remain.151  
 
                                                        
148 MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND PRACTICAL REASON 141-42 (1999). See also Alex Sarch, Double 
Effect and the Criminal Law, 11 CRIM. L. AND PHILOS. 453, 467-68 (2015). 
149 Bratman, supra 148 at 141. 
150 Id.  
151 For example, suppose the autonomous vehicle is actually aiming not to harm pedestrians by hitting them, but 
with something that merely correlates with hitting pedestrians—such as reducing the amount of shadows objects cast 
on the streets (as fewer shadows increases other metrics of reliable driving, which is the car’s primary goal). Should 
this be construed as intentionally hitting the pedestrians, or merely hitting them knowingly?  This is a familiar 
problem from criminal law theory and philosophy of action. (See e.g., Adam Feltz & Joshua May, The Means/Side-
Effect Distinction in Moral Cognition: A Meta-Analysis, 166 COGNITION 314 (2017).) We need not resolve this 
difficult question here to establish our main point that it is possible to make progress on extending mens rea terms to 
AI. Nonetheless, by analogy, we suspect this case would be plausibly be construed as intentionally hitting the 
pedestrian as a means to the self-driving car’s other goals. If the AI regulates its conduct to make hitting pedestrians 
more likely, this is not simply a “foreseen byproduct” of the AI behavior, but something it pursues as a means to 
accomplishing its deeper aims. Intending harm as a means suffices for showing purpose in the criminal law. If you 
kill a relative merely as the means to getting your inheritance, the killing still is purposeful. Alternatively, perhaps 
the “intended as a means/foreseen as a side-effect” distinction should be jettisoned as unworkable.  
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Similar strategies may be developed for arguing that an AI possessed other mens rea like 
knowledge. For example, on dispositional theories, knowledge may be attributed to an actor 
when the actor has a sufficiently robust set of dispositions pertaining to the truth of the 
proposition—such as the disposition to assent to the proposition if queried, to express surprise 
and update one’s plans if the proposition is revealed to be false, to behave consistently with the 
truth of the proposition or to depend on it carrying out one’s plans.152 In the criminal law, 
knowledge is defined as practical certainty.153 Thus, if we extend the above dispositional theory 
to AI, there is an argument for saying an AI knows a fact, F, if the AI displays a sufficiently 
robust set of dispositions associated with the truth of F—such as the disposition to respond 
affirmatively if queried (in a relevant way) whether F is practically certain to be true, or the 
disposition to revise plans upon receiving information showing that F is not practically certain, 
or the disposition to behave as if F is practically certain to be true. If enough of these dispositions 
are proven, then the knowledge that F could be attributed.154 One could take a similar approach 
to arguing that recklessness is present as well, as this requires only awareness that a substantial 
risk of harm is present—i.e. knowledge that the risk has a mid-level probability of materializing 
(below practical certainty).155  
 
Finally, as an alternative to direct arguments for showing AI mens rea, one could develop 
new imputation rules for AI. For example, one might follow the model of the collective 
knowledge doctrine, which identifies culpable interference with the flow of information within 
an organization and uses this as the basis for pretending as if the organization itself “knew” the 
facts it prevented itself from learning.156 The idea as applied here would be to take culpable 
conduct by the AI’s developers and use this as the basis for pretending the AI possessed a 
culpable mens rea itself. For example, if AI developers were reckless (or negligent) in their 
design, testing or production, and the AI goes on to cause harm, this could provide an argument 
for treating the AI itself as if it were reckless (or negligent) as to the harm caused.  
 
Although much more needs to be said for such arguments to be workable,157 it at least 
suggests that it may be possible to develop a set of legal doctrines by which courts could deem 
AIs to possess the mens rea elements of crimes.  
                                                        
152 Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief: Dispositionalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#1.2 (Traditional dispositional views of belief assert that for someone to 
believe some proposition P is for [her] to possess [relevant] behavioral dispositions pertaining to P. Often cited is the 
disposition to assent to utterances of P in [appropriate] circumstances. Other relevant dispositions might include the 
disposition to exhibit surprise should the falsity of P [become] evident, the disposition to assent to Q if shown that P 
implies Q, and to depend on P’s truth in [acting]. [More generally, this amounts to] being disposed to act as though 
P is the case.”).  
153 MPC, 2.02(2)(b) (defining knowledge as practical certainty). 
154 See Eric Schwitzgebel, In-between Believing, 51 PHIL. QUART., 76 (2001) (defending this approach to 
determining when to attribute beliefs to humans).  
155 MPC  2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness). 
156 ALEX SARCH, CRIMINALLY IGNORANT, ch. 9 (2019) (defending the collective knowledge doctrine as an equal 
culpability imputation rule for corporations); United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 
1987) (embracing one version of collective knowledge doctrine). 
157 Among other problems there may not be deterrence benefits to punishing autonomous vehicles that hit 
pedestrians due to code that could be reconstructed as embodying a culpable maxim (like “if you flip me off then I 
run you over”), but withholding such punishment from unexplainable machine learning code that results in the same 
thing. Why the later should not generate independent liability while the former would seems to be a distinction 
without a normative difference. 
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B. Other Retributivist Challenges: Reducibility and Spillover 
 
Even assuming AI is eligible for punishment, two further culpability-focused challenges 
remain. The first concerns the reducibility of any putative AI culpability, while the second 
concerns spillover of AI punishment onto innocent people nearby. This Section offers answers to 
both. 
 
1. Reducibility 
 
One might object that there is never a genuine need to punish AI because any time an AI 
seems criminally culpable in its own right, this culpability can always be reduced to that of 
nearby human actors—such as developers, owners, and users. The law could target the relevant 
culpable human actors instead. 
 
This objection has been raised against corporate punishment too. Skeptics argue that 
corporate culpability is always fully reducible to culpable actions of individual humans.158 Any 
time a corporation does something intuitively culpable—like causing a harmful oil spill through 
insufficient safety procedures—this can always be fully reduced to the culpability of the 
individuals involved: the person carrying out the safety checks, the designers of the safety 
protocols, the managers pushing employees to cut corners in search of savings. For any case 
offered to demonstrate the irreducibility of corporate culpability,159 a skeptic may creatively find 
additional wrongdoing by other individual actors further afield or in the past to account for the 
apparent corporate culpability.160  
 
This worry may not be as acute for AI as it is for corporations. AI seems able to behave in 
ways that are more autonomous from its developers than corporations are from their members. 
Corporations, after all, are simply composed out of their agents (albeit organized in particular 
structures). Also, AI may sometimes behave in ways that are less predictable and foreseeable 
than corporate conduct.  
 
In any case, there are ways to block the reducibility worry for corporate culpability as well as 
AI. The simplest response is to recall that it is legal culpability we are concerned with, not moral 
blameworthiness. Specifically, it would be bad policy for the criminal law to always allow any 
putative corporate criminal culpability to always be fully reduced to individual criminal liability. 
To ensure that corporate criminal culpability can always be reduced to individual criminal 
                                                        
158 See, e.g., Andras Szigeti, Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?, 
INSTITUTIONS, EMOTIONS, AND GROUP AGENTS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP ONTOLOGY 329-42 (2014) (A. 
Konzelmann Ziv and H.B. Schmid (eds.)) (arguing that the individualist analysis does not leave any responsibility-
deficit that would require a genuine group culpability). 
159 Consider Pettit and List’s notion of a “responsibility deficit.” Petit & List, supra note 146.  Perhaps “the 
individuals are blamelessly ignorant [or] act under such felt pressure that they cannot be held fully responsible for 
their contribution to a bad outcome; they can each argue that the circumstances mitigate their 
personal…responsibility.” Id. at 161. If the individuals have lowered culpability, then the total culpability for the 
group harm might seem greater than the sum of individual culpability. Whether such responsibility deficits can 
really arise, however, remains debatable. (After all, when the individuals are excused, might that lower the total 
amount of blame to be attributed for the group harm?) 
160 Id.  
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culpability would require criminalizing very minute bits of individual misconduct—momentary 
lapses of attention, the failure to perceive emerging problems that are difficult to notice, tiny bits 
of carelessness, mistakes in prioritizing time and resources, not being sufficiently critical of 
groupthink, and so on. Mature legal systems should not criminalize infinitely fine-grained forms 
of misconduct, but rather will focus on broader and more serious categories of directly harmful 
misconduct that can be straightforwardly defined, identified and prosecuted. Criminalizing all 
such small failures—and allowing law enforcement to investigate them—would be invasive and 
threatening to values like autonomy and freedom of expression and association.161 It would also 
increase the risk of abuse of process. Instead, we should expect “culpability deficits”162 in any 
well-designed system of criminal law, and this in turn creates a genuine need for corporate 
criminal culpability as an irreducible concept. 
 
Similar reasoning could be employed for AI culpability. There is reason to think it would be 
a bad system that encouraged law enforcement and prosecutors, any time an AI causes harm, to 
invasively delve into the internal activities of the organizations developing the AI in search of 
minute individual misconduct—perhaps even the slightest negligence or failure to plan for highly 
unlikely exigencies. It would be a disturbingly invasive criminal justice system that creates a 
sufficient number of individual offenses to ensure that any potential AI culpability can always be 
fully reduced to individual crimes. Hence, where AI is concerned, we do not think the 
Reducibility Challenge—at least as applied to legal culpability—imposes a categorical bar to 
punishing AI. 
 
2. Spillover 
 
A final retributivist challenge to punishing AI is the “spillover problem,” again familiar from 
the corporate context.163 Because corporate punishments (usually in the form of fines) amount to 
a hit to the corporation’s bottom line, these punishments inevitably spill over onto innocent 
shareholders.164 This might seem to violate the desert constraint against the state harming people 
in excess of their desert. The same objection has been raised against punishing AI. Mulligan 
worries that “[o]ne could…imagine situations where the notion of separating a rogue robot from 
its owner [or damaging or restricting the robot in punishing it] would create a disproportionate 
burden on the owner, for example if a robot was unique, unusually expensive relative to the harm 
caused, or difficult to replace.”165 This is just a version of the spillover problem. If the AI system 
unforeseeably causes harm, it may seem unfair or disproportionate to its innocent owner or 
operator to damage the AI system in punishment. 
 
There are familiar responses to the spillover objection for corporations. First, one might 
contend that spillover does not qualify as punishment because it is not imposed on a shareholder 
for her offense.166 Nonetheless, this definitional answer is somewhat unsatisfying, as there 
                                                        
161 Cf. Hart, supra note 67 (ch. 1).  
162 See Pettit & List, supra note 159 (defending “responsibility deficits” as creating a need for irreducible corporate 
accountability). 
163 Thomas, surpa note 146. 
164 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 863 (2d ed. 1961) (noting that “a fine imposed on 
the corporation is in reality aimed against shareholders who are not…responsible for the crime, i.e., is aimed against 
innocent persons”). 
165 Mulligan, supra note 108 at 594.  
166 See supra note 67 at 4-5. 
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clearly are strong reasons for the state not to knowingly harm innocent bystanders even if it does 
not strictly count as punishment.  
 
A better answer is that spillover is not a special problem for corporate or AI punishment. 
Most forms of punishment—including punishment of individual wrongdoers—has the potential 
to harm the innocent, as when a convicted person has dependent children. Spillover objections 
may simply expose general problems with criminal law. The fact that punishment tends to harm 
the innocent suggests a need to reform criminal law as well as prisons, reentry programs and 
similar initiatives to lessen the collateral consequences of punishment of all types. In the 
corporate context, some have recently responded to the spillover objection by defending reforms 
to corporate punishments so the “pain” they impose is more accurately distributed to the culpable 
actors within the company who contributed to the crime.167 For example, Will Thomas argues 
that managers found to have contributed to a crime by the corporation should have their 
incentive compensation clawed back to satisfy the criminal fines that were levied against the 
corporation in the first instance.168 
 
When it comes to AI punishment, similar thinking applies. To the extent spillover is a 
concern, AI punishments should be narrowly tailored. Destroying an AI, for example, would be a 
blunt remedy that is more likely to harm the innocent. More tailored remedies might be 
implemented instead, such as reprogramming the AI, or civil remedies directed at responsible 
persons. In such ways, the punishment of AI systems could be crafted to minimize the spillover 
effects.  Further, spillover may be less of a concern in the case of Hard AI Crime, where there 
may be little nexus between AI punishment and harm to innocent individuals. Even here, 
spillover could be largely addressed through well-designed mechanisms like the ex-ante creation 
of a financially responsible party or creation of a fund to cover criminal liability as a condition of 
operation the AI system (akin to criminal liability insurance). We explore such implementation 
ideas further in the next Part.  The spillover problem thus is not an absolute bar to AI 
punishment. It is an omnipresent problem with criminal punishment, which must be addressed 
for any novel mode of criminal punishment—whether for corporations or AI.  
 
V. FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
 
We have argued that punishing AI could have benefits and that it is not ruled out by the 
negative limitations and retributive preconditions of punishment. But this does not yet show the 
punishment of AI to be justified. This requires addressing the third main question in our theory 
of punishment: Would the benefits of punishing AI outweigh the costs, and would it be better 
than alternative solutions? These solutions might involve doing nothing, or relying on civil 
liability and regulatory responses, perhaps together with less radical or disruptive changes to 
criminal laws that target individuals. 
 
Section A focuses Hard AI Crime, and finds that existing criminal law coverage will likely 
fall short. Section B argues that AI punishment has significant costs that suggest alternative 
approaches may be preferable. In Sections C and D, we map out some alternative approaches to 
managing AI crime. In particular, we examine moderate expansions of the criminal law as well 
                                                        
167 Thomas, surpa note 146. 
168 Id. at 80-84. 
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as the tools available within civil law, and we argue that they have the resources to provide 
preferable solutions to the problem of Hard AI Crime. 
 
A. First Alternative: the Status Quo 
 
In considering the alternatives to direct punishment of AI, we begin with asking whether it 
would be preferable to simply do nothing. This section answers that existing criminal law falls 
short: there is an AI criminal gap that requires a response. 
 
1) What the AI criminal gap is not: reducible harmful conduct by AI  
 
We begin by setting aside something that will not much concern us: cases where 
responsibility for harmful AI conduct is fully reducible to the culpable conduct of individual 
human actors. A clear example would be one where a hacker uses AI to steal funds from 
individual bank accounts. There is no need to punish AI in such cases, because existing criminal 
offenses, like fraud or computer crimes, are sufficient to respond to this type of behavior.169  
 
Even if additional computer-related offenses must be created to adequately deter novel 
crimes implemented with the use of AI, the criminal law has further familiar tools at its disposal, 
involving individual-focused crimes, which provide other avenues of criminal liability when AI 
causes foreseeable harms. For example, as Hallevy observes, cases of this sort could possibly be 
prosecuted under an innocent “agency model” (assuming AI can sensibly be treated as meeting 
the preconditions of an innocent agent, even if not of a fully criminally responsible agent in its 
own right).170 Under the innocent agency doctrine, criminal liability attaches to a person who 
acts through an agent who lacks capacity—such as a child or an insane person. For instance, if an 
adult uses a five-year old child to deliver illegal drugs, the adult rather than the child would 
generally be criminally liable.171 This could be analogous to a person programming a 
sophisticated AI to break the law: the person has liability for intentionally causing the AI to bring 
about the external elements of the offense.172  
 
This doctrine requires intent (or at least the knowledge) that the innocent agent will cause the 
prohibited result in question.173 This means that in cases where someone does not intend or 
                                                        
169 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(7) (defining offenses such as computer trespass and computer fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 
(wire fraud statute). 
170 Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities, 11 (section III.B) (Mar. 4 2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564096 
171  Sanford Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 
372-73 (1985) (“Most criminal actions can readily be committed through the instrumentality of another person”). 
172 One might have doubts about this model of liability, too. After all, if AI is merely a tool, one would simply 
prosecute the user of the AI on a direct liability model. However, if AI is to be analogized to some kind of 
autonomous actor, which could break the chain of causation, akin to a child perhaps, then the innocent agency model 
would seem more apt. In any case, we argued in Part IV that AI might plausibly count as an agent at least for legal 
purposes. Therefore, we think it is not ruled out at least in principle that the innocent agency model of liability could 
be applied to actors who cause AI to produce criminally prohibited results.  
173 Peter Alldridge, The Doctrine of Innocent Agency, 2 CRIM. L. FORUM 45 (1990); 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (“Whoever 
willfully causes an act to be done which [is a crime] is punishable as a principal”). This intent requirement for 
innocent agency is similar to complicity liability, used where the actor assists or encourages another full-fledged 
agent with capacity to do a crime, which also requires intent or knowledge by the accomplice that the principal actor 
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foresee that the AI system being used will cause harm, the innocent agency model does not 
provide a route to liability. In such cases, one could instead appeal to recklessness or negligence 
liability if AI creates a foreseeable risk of a prohibited harm.174 For example, if the developers or 
users of AI foresee a substantial and unjustified risk that an AI will cause the death of a person 
these human actors could be convicted of reckless homicide.175 If such a risk was merely 
reasonably foreseeable (but not foreseen), then lower forms of homicide liability would be 
available.176 Similar forms of recklessness or negligence liability could be adopted where the 
AI’s designers or users actually foresaw, or should have foreseen, a substantial and unjustified 
risk of other kinds of harms as well—such as theft or property damage.177  
 
Hallevy also discusses this form of criminal liability for AI-generated harms, calling it the 
“natural and probable consequences model” of liability.178 This is an odd label, however, since 
the natural and probable consequences doctrine generally applies only when the defendant is 
already an accomplice to—i.e., intended—the crime of another. More specifically, the “natural 
and probable consequences” rule provides that where A intentionally aided B’s underlying crime 
C1 (say theft), but then B also goes on to commit a different crime C2 (say murder), then A 
would be guilty of C2 as well provided C2 was reasonably foreseeable.179 
 
Despite his choice of label, Hallevy seems alive to this complication and correctly observes 
that there are two ways in which negligence liability could apply to AI-generated harms that are 
reasonably foreseeable. He writes:  
 
the natural-probable-consequence liability model [applied] to the programmer or user differ 
in two different types of factual cases. The first type of case is when the programmers or 
users were negligent while programming or using the AI entity but had no criminal intent to 
commit any offense. The second type of case is when the programmers or users programmed 
or used the AI entity knowingly and willfully in order to commit one offense via the AI 
entity, but the AI entity deviated from the plan and committed some other offense, in 
addition to or instead of the planned offense.180 
 
In either sort of scenario, there would be a straightforward basis for applying existing criminal 
law doctrines to impose criminal liability on the programmers or users of an AI that causes 
reasonably foreseeable harms. Thus, no AI criminal gap exists here. 
 
                                                        
will do the crime. United States v. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243, 1250 (2014) (clarifying mens rea for 
complicity). 
174 MPC § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (defining recklessness and negligence).  
175 MPC § 210.3(a) (recklessly causing death suffices for manslaughter). 
176 MPC § 210.4 (negligent homicide). 
177 MPC 220.1(2) (reckless burning or exploding); 220.2(2) (risking catastrophe); 220.3 (criminal mischief). 
178 Hallevy, supra note 12 at 18-19. 
179 The rule holds that the aider and abettor ‘of an initial crime…is also liable for any consequent crime committed 
by the principal, even if he or she did not abet the second crime, as long as the consequent crime is a natural and 
probable consequence of the first crime.’  Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking? The Mental States of the Aider 
and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1424 (2002); United States v. Barnett, 
667 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting natural or probable consequences doctrine). 
180 Hallevy, supra note 12 at 19. 
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A slightly harder scenario involves reducible harms by AI that are not foreseeable, but this is 
still something criminal law has tools to deal with. Imagine hackers use an AI to drain a fund of 
currency, but this ends up unforeseeably shutting down an electrical grid which results in 
widespread harm. The hackers are already guilty of something—namely, the theft of currency (if 
they succeed) or the attempt to do so (if they failed). Therefore, our question here is whether the 
hackers can be convicted of any further crime in virtue of their causing harm through their AI 
unforeseeably taking down an electrical grid.181  
 
At first sight, it might seem that the hackers would be in the clear for the electrical grid. They 
could argue that they did not proximately cause those particular harms. Crimes like 
manslaughter or property damage carry a proximate cause requirement under which the 
prohibited harm must at least be a reasonably foreseeable type of consequence of the conduct 
that the actors intentionally carried out.182 But in this case, taking down the electrical grid and 
causing physical harm to human victims was assumed to be entirely unforeseeable even to a 
reasonable actor in the defendant’s shoes. 
 
The criminal law has tools to deal with this kind of scenario too. This comes in the form of 
so-called constructive liability crimes. These are crimes that consist of a base crime which 
require a mens rea, but where there then is a further result element as to which no mens rea is 
required. Felony murder is a classic example.183 Suppose one breaks into a home one believes to 
be empty in order to steal artwork. Thus, one commits the base crime of burglary.184 However, 
suppose further that the home turns out not to be empty, and the burglar startles the homeowner 
who has a heart attack and dies. This could make the burglar guilty of felony murder.185 This is a 
constructive liability crime because the liability for murder is constructed out of the base offense 
(burglary) plus causing the death (even where this is unforeseeable). According to the leading 
theory of constructive liability crimes, they are normatively justifiable when the base crime in 
question (burglary) typically carries at least the risk of the same general type of harm as the 
constructive liability element at issue (death).186 
 
This tool, if extended to the AI case, provides a familiar way to hold the hackers criminally 
liable for unforeseeably taking down the electrical grid and causing physical harm to human 
victims.  
 
It may be beneficial to create a new constructive liability crime that takes a criminal act like 
the attempt to steal currency using AI as the base offense, and then taking the further harm to the 
                                                        
181 Compare this case to the one where some kids are illegally using fireworks in their back yard, and this causes a 
massive forest fire destroying many homes. Sure, they can be convicted of any offenses, if any, related to illicitly 
using the fireworks. But can they also be convicted of offenses related to the massive forest fire and destroyed 
homes? 
182 See, e.g., MPC 2.03(2) (characterizing proximate or legal causation requirement using a “scope of the risk” test). 
183 WAYNE LAFAVE, 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 14.5 (2d ed.) (explaining felony murder as the doctrine that “one whose 
conduct brought about an unintended death in the commission or attempted commission of a felony was guilty of 
murder”). 
184 MPC 221.1 (defining burglary). 
185 LaFave, supra note 183.  
186 Andrew Simester, CRIMINAL LAW, chapter 15.5 (manuscript on file with authors) (arguing that constructive 
liability as to a result is justified when it is “intrinsic to the culpability of the defendant”). To the extent one has 
normative qualms about the inclusion of such strict liability elements, one could mitigate this worry by requiring the 
mens rea of negligence as to the further harm element—though that would prevent this kind of crime from being of 
any use when the further harm is unforeseeable, as it is stipulated to be in the cases in question here. 
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electrical grid, or other property or physical harm, as the constructive liability element, which 
requires no mens rea (not even negligence) in order to be guilty of the more serious crime. This 
constructive liability offense, in a slogan, could be called Causing Harm Through Criminal Uses 
of AI.  
 
New crimes could be adopted to the extent there are not already crimes on the books that fit 
this mold. Indeed, in the present example, one might think there are already some available 
constructive liability crimes. Perhaps felony murder insofar as attempting to steal currency may 
be a felony, and this conduct caused fatalities. However, this tool would be of no avail in respect 
to the property damage caused. This is why a new crime like Causing Harm Through Criminal 
Uses of AI would seem to be necessary. In any case, no AI criminal gap is present here because 
the criminal law has familiar tools available for dealing with unforeseeable harms of this kind. 
 
2) What the AI Criminal gap is: irreducible criminal conduct by AI 
 
Consider a case of irreducible AI crime inspired by RDS. Suppose an AI is designed to 
purchase class materials for incoming Harvard students, but, through being trained on data from 
online student discussions regarding engineering projects, the AI unforeseeably “learns” to 
purchase radioactive material on the darkweb and has it shipped to student housing. Suppose the 
programmers of this “Harvard Automated Shopper” did nothing criminal in designing the system 
and they had entirely lawful aims. Nonetheless, despite the reasonable care taken by the 
programmers—and subsequent purchasers and users of the AI (i.e., Harvard)—the AI caused 
student deaths. 
 
In this hypothetical, there are no upstream actors who could be held criminally liable. 
Innocent agency is blocked as a mode of liability because the programmers, users and developers 
of the AI did not have the intent or foresight that any prohibited or harmful results would 
ensue—as is required for innocent agency to be available.187 Moreover, if the risk of the AI 
purchasing the designer drugs was not reasonably foreseeable, then criminal negligence would 
also be blocked. Finally, constructive liability is not available in cases of this sort because there 
is no “base crime”—no underlying culpable conduct by the programmers and users of the AI—
out of which their liability for the unforeseeable harms the AI causes could be constructed.  
 
One could imagine various attempts to extend existing criminal law tools to provide criminal 
liability for developers or users. Most obviously, new negligence crimes could be added for 
developers that make it a crime to develop systems that foreseeably could produce a risk of any 
serious harm or unlawful consequence, even if a specific risk was unforeseeable. The trouble is 
that this does not seem to amount to individually culpable conduct, as all activities and 
technologies involve some risks of some harm. So this expansion of the criminal law would stifle 
innovation and beneficial commercial activities. If there were such a crime, all the early 
developers of the internet would be guilty of it.188 
 
B. The Costs of Punishing AI 
                                                        
187 See supra note 173. 
188 For related reasons, we would reject proposals to impose strict criminal liability on developers of AI that 
autonomously causes harms. Strict liability crimes for designers amounts to punishing the innocent. See supra note 
129 and accompanying text. 
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Earlier, we discussed some of the potential costs of AI punishment, including conceptual 
confusion, expressive costs, and spillover. Even aside from these, punishment of AI would entail 
serious practical challenges as well as substantial changes to criminal law. Begin with a practical 
challenge: the mens rea analysis.189 For individuals, the mens rea analysis is generally how 
culpability is assessed. Causing a given harm with a higher mens rea like intent is usually seen as 
more culpable than causing the same harm with a lower mens rea like recklessness or 
negligence.190 But how do we make sense of the question of mens rea for AI?  
 
Section IV considered this problem, and argued that for some AI, as for corporations, the 
mental state of an AI’s developer, owner, or user could be imputed under something like the 
respondeat superior doctrine. But for cases of Hard AI Crime that is not straightforwardly 
reduced to human conduct—particularly where the harm is unforeseeable to designers and there 
is no upstream human conduct that is seriously unreasonable to be found—nothing like 
respondeat superior would be appropriate. Some other approach to AI mens rea would be 
required.  
 
A regime of strict liability offenses could be defined for AI crimes. However, this would 
require a legislative work-around so that AI are deemed capable of satisfying voluntary act, 
applicable to all crimes.191 This would require major revisions to the criminal law and a great 
deal of concerted legislative effort. It is far from an off-the-shelf solution. Alternately, a new 
legal fiction of AI mens rea, vaguely analogous to human mens rea, could be developed, but this 
too is not currently a workable solution. This approach could require expert testimony to enable 
courts to consider in detail how the relevant AI functioned to assess whether it was able to 
consider legally relevant values and interests but did not weight them sufficiently, and whether 
the programming has the relevant behavioral dispositions associated with mens rea like intention 
or knowledge. We tentatively sketched several types of argument that courts might use to find 
various mental states to be present in an AI. However, much more theoretical and technical work 
is required here, and we do not regard this as a first best option. 
 
Mens rea, and similar challenges related to the voluntary act requirement, are only some of 
the practical problems to be solved in order to make AI punishment workable. For instance, there 
may be enforcement problems with punishing an AI on a blockchain. Such AIs might be 
particularly difficult to effectively combat or deactivate.  
 
Even assuming the practical issues are resolved, punishing AI would still require major 
changes to criminal law. Legal personality is necessary to charge and convict an AI of a crime, 
and conferring legal personhood on AIs would create a whole new mode of criminal liability, 
much the way that corporate criminal liability constitutes a new such mode beyond individual 
criminal liability.192 There are problems with implementing such a significant reform.  
                                                        
189 See supra section IV.A.1. 
190 See, e.g., Kenneth Simons, Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
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Over the years, there have been many proposals for extending some kind of legal personality 
to AI.193 Perhaps most famously, a 2017 report by the European Parliament called on the 
European Commission to create a legislative instrument to deal with “civil liability caused by 
robots.”194 It further requested the Commission to consider “a specific legal status for robots”, 
and “possibly applying electronic personality” as one solution to tort liability.195 Even in such a 
speculative and tentative form this proposal proved highly controversial. More than 150 AI 
experts subsequently sent an open letter to the European Commission warning that, “[f]rom an 
ethical and legal perspective, creating a legal personality for a robot is inappropriate whatever 
the legal status model.”196 
 
Full-fledged legal personality for AIs equivalent to that afforded to natural persons, with all 
the legal rights that natural persons enjoy, would clearly be inappropriate. To take a banal 
example, allowing AI to vote would undermine democracy, given the ease with which anyone 
looking to determine the outcome of an election could create AIs to vote for a particular 
candidate. 197 However, legal personality comes in many flavors, even for natural persons such 
as children who lack many adult rights and obligations. Crucially, no artificial person enjoys all 
of the same rights and obligations as a natural person.198 The best-known class of artificial 
persons, companies, have long enjoyed only a limited set of rights and obligations that allows 
them to sue and be sued, enter contracts, incur debt, own property, and be convicted of crimes.199  
However, they do not receive protection under constitutional provisions such as the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they cannot bear arms, run for or hold public 
office, marry, or enjoy other fundamental rights that are enjoyed by natural persons.200 Other 
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artificial persons with legal personality, such as maritime vessels, have even fewer rights.201 
Thus, granting legal personality to AI to allow it to be punished would not require AI to receive 
the rights afforded to natural persons, or even those afforded to companies. AI legal personality 
could consist solely of obligations.  
 
Even so, any sort of legal personhood for AIs would be a dramatic legal change that could 
prove problematic. As discussed earlier, providing legal personality to AI could result in 
increased anthropomorphisms. People anthropomorphizing AI expect it to adhere to social norms 
and have higher expectations regarding AI capabilities.202 This is problematic where such 
expectations are inaccurate and the AI is operating in a position of trust. Especially for 
vulnerable users, such anthropomorphisms could result in “cognitive and psychological damages 
to manipulability and reduced quality of life.”203 These outcomes may be more likely if AI were 
held accountable by the state in ways normally reserved only for human members of society. 
Strengthening questionable anthropomorphic tendencies regarding AI could also lead to more 
violent or destructive behavior directed at AI, such as vandalism or attacks.204 Further, punishing 
AI could also affect human well-being in less direct ways, such as by producing anxiety about 
one’s own status within society due to the perception that AIs are given a legal status on a par 
with human beings. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most worryingly, conferring legal personality on AI may lead to rights 
creep. Even if AIs are given few or no rights initially when they are first granted legal 
personhood, they may gradually acquire rights over time. Granting legal personhood to AI may 
thus be an important step down a slippery slope. In a 1933 Supreme Court opinion, for instance, 
Justice Brandeis warned about rights creep, and that granting companies an excess of rights 
could allow them to dominate the State.205 Eighty years after that decision, Justice Brandeis’ 
concerns were prescient in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence such as Citizen’s United 
and Hobby Lobby, which significantly expanded the rights extended to corporations.206 Such 
rights, for corporations and AI, can restrict valuable human activities and freedoms. 
 
C. Second Alternative: Minimally Extending the Criminal Law 
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There are alternatives to direct AI punishment other than doing nothing. The problem of 
Hard AI crime would more reasonably be addressed through minimal extensions of existing 
criminal law. The most obvious would be to define new crimes for individuals. Just as the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act criminalizes gaining unauthorized access or information using 
personal computers,207 an AI Abuse Act could criminalize malicious or reckless uses of AI. In 
addition, such an Act might criminalize the failure to responsibly design, deploy, test, train and 
monitor the AIs one contributed to developing. These new crimes would target individual 
conduct that is culpable along familiar dimensions, so they may be of limited utility with regard 
to Hard AI Crimes that do not reduce to culpable actors. Accordingly, a different way to expand 
the criminal law seems needed to address Hard AI Crime.  
 
In cases of Hard AI Crime, a designated adjacent person could be punished who would not 
otherwise be directly criminally liable—what we call a Responsible Person. This could involve 
new forms of criminal negligence for failing to discharge statutory duties (perhaps relying on 
strict criminal liability) in order to make a person liable in cases of Hard AI Crime. It could be a 
requirement for anyone creating or using an AI to ex ante register a Responsible Person for the 
AI.208 It could be a crime to design or operate AI capable of causing harm without designating a 
Responsible Person.209 This would be akin to the offense of driving without a license.210 The 
registration system might be maintained by a federal agency. However, a registration scheme is 
problematic because it is difficult to distinguish between AI capable of criminal activity and AI 
not capable of criminal activity, especially when we are dealing with unforeseeable criminal 
activity. Even simple and innocuous seeming AI could end up causing serious harm. Thus, it 
might be necessary to designate a Responsible Person for any AI. Registration might involve 
substantial administrative burden and, given the increasing prevalence of AI, the costs associated 
with mandatory registration might outweigh any benefits.  
 
A default rule rather than a registration system might be preferable. The Responsible Person 
could be the AI’s manufacturer or supplier if it is a commercial product. If it is not a commercial 
product, the Responsible Person could be the AI’s owner, developer if no owner exists, or user if 
no developer can be identified. Even non-commercial AIs are usually owned as property, 
although that may not always be the case, for instance, with some open-source software. 
Similarly, all AI has human developers, and in the event an AI ever autonomously creates 
another AI, responsibility for the criminal acts of an AI-created AI could reach back to the 
original AI’s owner. In the event an AI’s developer cannot be identified, or potentially if there 
are a large number of developers, again in the case of some open-source software, responsibility 
could attach to an AI’s user. Though, this would fail to catch the rare, perhaps only hypothetical, 
case of the non-commercial AI with no owner, no identifiable developer, and no user. To the 
                                                        
207 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). 
208 A new criminal offense—akin to driving without a license—could be imposed for cases where programmers, 
developers, owners or users have unreasonably failed to designate a Responsible Person for an AI. 
209 The Responsible Person should also be liable for harms caused by an AI where the AI, if a natural person, would 
be criminally liable together with another individual. Otherwise, there is a risk that sophisticated AI developers 
could create machines that cause harm but rely co-conspirators to escape liability.  
210 There is precedent for such a Responsible Person registration scheme. In the corporate context, executives may 
be required to attest to the validity of some SEC filings and held strictly liable for false statements even where they 
have done nothing directly negligent. If the Responsible Person is a person at a company where a company owns the 
AI, it would have to be an executive to avoid the problem of setting up a low-level employee as “fallguy.” The SEC 
for this reason requires a C-level executive to attest to certain statements on filings. 
 
  39 
extent that a non-commercial AI owner, developer and user working together would prefer a 
different responsibility arrangement, they might be permitted to agree to a different ex ante 
selection of the Responsible Person.211 That might be more likely to occur with sophisticated 
parties where there is a greater risk of Hard AI Crime. The Responsible Person could even be an 
artificial person such as a corporation.212  
 
It would be possible to impose criminal liability on the Responsible Persons directly in the 
event of Hard AI Crime. For example, if new statutory duties of supervision and care were 
defined regarding the AI for which the Responsible Person is answerable, criminal negligence 
liability could be imposed on the Responsible Person should he or she unreasonably fail to 
discharge those duties. Granted, this would not be punishment for the harmful conduct of the AI 
itself. Rather, it would be a form of direct criminal liability imposed on the Responsible Person 
for his or her own conduct. 
 
More boldly, if this does not go far enough to address Hard AI Crime, criminal liability could 
also be imposed on the Responsible Person on a strict liability basis—particularly if the relevant 
punishments are only fines rather than incarceration. Generally strict liability crimes are 
restricted to minor infractions or regulatory offenses or “violations”,213 though some examples of 
more serious strict criminal liability can also be found (such as statutory rape in some 
jurisdictions).214 This could be defended by claiming that there is a special duty owed to society 
at large to provide special assurances that certain especially serious risks will be mitigated as 
much as possible.215 A Responsible Person accepting strict criminal liability could serve this 
function. Especially in the case of AI where user trust is critical to realizing the benefits of AI, 
this approach could be warranted to combat the perception that unsafe AI is being employed. 
Accordingly, AI could become another context in which strict criminal liability on the 
Responsible Person is imposed. 
 
Yet we have serious reservations about strict liability crimes applied to persons.216 If at all, 
they can only be justifiably used as a last resort in exigent circumstances—as in cases of 
unusually dangerous activities. However, it is not obvious that the use of AI qualifies as 
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unusually dangerous. To the contrary, in many areas of activity it would be unreasonable not to 
use AI, as when safety can be improved over human actors such as may soon be the case with 
self-driving cars.217 Most bad human actors using AI systems to commit crimes will still be 
caught under existing criminal laws, and so far there have not been high-profile cases of Hard AI 
Crimes. As a result, we are not yet convinced that Hard AI Crime is a significant enough social 
problem to merit the use of strict criminal liability.  
 
At the end of the day, a Responsible Person regime accompanied by new statutory duties, 
which carry criminal penalties if these duties are negligently or recklessly breached, provides an 
attractive approach to dealing with Hard AI Crime. While it is only a minimal expansion of the 
criminal law, by expressing condemnation through a criminal conviction of the Responsible 
Person, much of the expressive benefit from a direct conviction AI can be achieved—but without 
as serious a loss of public trust as the legal fictions needed to punish AI directly would create.  
 
D. Third Alternative: Moderate Changes to Civil Liability 
 
A further alternative to dealing with Hard AI Crime is to look to the civil law, primarily tort 
law, as a method of both imposing legal accountability and deterring harmful AI. Some AI crime 
will no doubt already result in civil liability, however, if existing civil liability falls short, new 
liability rules could be introduced. A civil liability approach could even be used in conjunction 
with expansions to criminal liability. 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to canvas gaps in civil liability for AI crime, it is 
worth noting that existing civil liability comes with built-in limitations. Very few laws 
specifically address AI-generated harms, which means civil liability must usually be established 
under a traditional negligence or product liability framework or under contractual liability.218 
Negligence generally requires a person to act carelessly, so where this cannot be established 
there may be no recovery. Product liability may require both that an AI is a commercial product 
(e.g., this may not apply where AI is just software or the use of AI is a “service”), and that there 
be a defect in the product (or that its properties are falsely represented).219 In the case of complex 
AI, it may be difficult to prove a defect, and AI may cause harm without a “defect” in the 
product liability sense. For these reasons, the European Commission has created Expert Groups 
to determine whether new technologies necessitate a revision of the Product Liability Directive, 
which harmonizes product liability across the European Union, and whether even more 
ambitious changes are needed.220 Civil liability may also derive from contractual relationships, 
but this usually only applies where there is privity of contract between parties, and it may also 
have significant limitations.221  
 
To the extent there is inadequate civil liability for Hard AI Crimes, the Responsible Person 
proposal sketched above could be repurposed so that the Responsible Person might only be 
civilly liable. The case against a Responsible Person could be akin to a tort action if brought by 
an individual or a class of plaintiffs, or a civil enforcement action if brought by a government 
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agency tasked with regulating AI. At trial, an AI would not be treated like a corporation, where 
the corporation itself is held to have done the harmful act and the law treats the company as a 
singular acting and “thinking” entity. Rather, the question for adjudication would be whether the 
Responsible Person discharged his or her duties of care in respect of the AI in a reasonable 
way—or else civil liability could also be imposed on a strict liability basis (a less troubling 
prospect than it is within the criminal law). 
 
A Responsible Person scheme is not the only solution to inadequate civil liability for Hard AI 
Crimes. An insurance scheme is another approach.222 Owners, developers or users of AI, or just 
certain types of AI, could pay a tax into a fund to ensure adequate compensation for victims of 
Hard AI Crime. The cost of this tax would be relatively minor compared to the financial benefits 
of AI. This could either replace the Responsible Person solution or apply to cases whether no 
appropriate Responsible Person exists. An AI compensation fund could operate like the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP).223 Vaccines result in widespread social benefit 
but are known in rare cases to cause serious problems. VICP is a no-fault alternative to 
traditional tort liability that compensates individuals injured by a VICP-covered vaccine. It is 
funded by a tax on vaccines which is paid by users.224 Other models for an insurance scheme 
exist, such as the Price Anderson Act for nuclear power. 225  
 
E. Concluding Thoughts  
 
This Article has argued that, confronted with the growing possibility of Hard AI Crime, we 
should not overreact and reach for the radical tool of punishing AI. Alternative approaches could 
provide substantially similar benefits and would avoid many of the pitfalls and difficulties 
involved in punishing AI. A natural alternative, we argued, involves modest expansions to the 
criminal law, including, most importantly, new negligence crimes centered around the improper 
design, operation and testing of AI applications as well as possible criminal penalties for 
designated parties who fail to discharge statutory duties. This could be supplemented by 
expanded civil liability. 
 
We took a careful look at how a criminal law regime that punished AI might be constructed 
and defended. In so doing, we showed that it is all too easy to underestimate the ability of 
criminal law theory to accommodate substantial reforms. We explored the ways in which the 
criminal law can—and, where corporations are involved, already does—appeal to elaborate legal 
fictions to provide a basis within the defensible boundaries of criminal law theory for punishing 
some artificial entities. We showed what a system of punishment for AI might look like and 
showed how some hasty arguments against it can be answered. 
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The use of legal fictions to solve difficult conceptual questions or practical problems—such 
as how to conceptualize or prove particular sorts of mental elements for AI or misbehavior by its 
developers—gives criminal law theory impressive plasticity. Legal fictions help turn the criminal 
law into a pragmatic tool for solving social problems. Nonetheless, legal fictions must be used 
with caution, as their over-use risks eroding public trust and weakening the rule of law. 
Moreover, allowing legal fictions to proliferate unchecked can lead to widespread injustice either 
through punishing the innocent or by punishing more harshly than one’s culpability calls for. 
While some legal fictions can be justified,226 they must be used judiciously. For this reason, there 
is and should be an onerous burden to meet before we can be confident that a particular legal 
fiction—such as legal personality for AI or the invention of culpable mental states for AI—is 
adopted. Embracing legal fiction without meeting this justificatory burden would be tantamount 
to believing in science fiction. 
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